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SUMMARY 
This working paper offers a framework and roadmap 
for development of a robust groundwater-sharing 
system consistent with California’s Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act, which requires 
communities in priority areas to prepare groundwater 
sustainability plans.
The proposed system draws on global experience. 
Robustness is its signature feature. Opportunities 
are maximized by a suite of robust local governance, 
allocation, and administrative arrangements. 
Additionally, the proposed system incentivizes 
innovation, stimulates investment, and facilitates low-
cost adjustment to changes in groundwater demand.
Among the dynamic components underlying this 
sharing system is a share register that records 
ownership and transfers of ownership in a basin’s 
available shares. These unit shares are fungible; each 
represents a proportional stake in access to the basin’s 
groundwater resources. Volumetric allocations are 
made in proportion to the number of shares held 
during determined periods throughout the water year. 
These allocations are recorded in bank-like water 
accounts, affording account holders an efficient means 
to manage their resource but also ensuring that they 
cannot use more than is available. Unused water can 
be saved for later use. At the start of the transition to 
the new system, users are given an allocation buffer so 
that they have flexibility and time to adjust. Those who 
want to can make quick non-contestable trades at low 
cost.
Mike Young* and Bryce McAteer**
NICHOLAS INSTITUTE
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SOLUTIONS
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OVERVIEW	  
California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) calls on local agencies to find a way 
to avoid six undesirable results associated with groundwater use. This report seeks to help the 127 
basin communities involved by offering a mockup of the groundwater plan that each of these 
communities is being encouraged to prepare. In essence, it is suggested that water-sharing systems be 
used to bring local groundwater use within sustainable limits. 
The roadmap’s core features draw on the global experience in water resource management. If 
implemented, it can be expected to bring about a considerable increase in wealth and community 
resilience. Communities that adopt the proposed system can expect to deliver SGMA outcomes at less 
cost and greater benefits and also to become wealthier and more resilient. 
Robustness	  
The arrangements chosen are designed to make the strategies and mechanisms used to manage 
groundwater use in California as robust as possible. 
Robust systems withstand the test of time. They endure and function well under pressure. Often, they 
have a sense of simplicity and elegance. They tend to be easy to describe. Typically, they build 
resilient, prosperous communities. 
Under the proposed groundwater sharing regime, there are increased incentives and rewards for 
efficient water use and innovation, for those willing to adapt. The proposed transition pathway is 
clear. Water trading is encouraged. 
Markets	  and	  Trading	  
Throughout California, there has been much interest in the potential of market-like processes to 
improve groundwater use. This report delivers a simple message. If markets have a useful role to play 
in water allocation, then, rather than focusing on building markets, it is better to first build the 
institutional arrangements that make low-cost trading possible. The next step is surrounding these 
arrangements with administrative structures and accounting systems that can be and are trusted. If the 
resultant system has integrity and can be banked on, then markets will emerge naturally. 
The tests of the robustness and integrity of a good water management system are the frequency with 
which people trade opportunities to use and invest in water, the worth of the assets so created, and the 
rarity of legal arguments. Along the way, costs have to be kept low and everyone given the 
opportunity to search for better ways to use groundwater. 
Sharing	  
In essence, SGMA identifies a need for local groundwater-dependent communities to find a new way 
to share access to groundwater and keep use within sustainable limits. If access has to be shared, then 
it makes conceptual sense to issue shares. The roadmap suggests that communities consider using 
shares to define each user’s long-term and ongoing interest in a groundwater resource. 
Shares, when issued, entitle their holder to a proportion of the total amount of water that may be taken 
from a defined water resource. 
Robust sharing systems are characterized by a simple rule: If someone wants a larger share, then he or 
she has to find a way to persuade someone else to take a smaller share. 
Value can be added and opportunities increased by guaranteeing the integrity of share registers and 
making shares mortgageable. To encourage investment, these shares are issued in perpetuity. 
When shares can be mortgaged at low cost, the associated registers have integrity, and trusted 
administrative systems are put in place, banks become interested in financing much more investment 
than otherwise would be the case. 
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Allocations	  
Sharing is a long-term concept. Dynamism can be brought into the system by making annual 
allocations to shareholders in proportion to the number of shares they hold. 
Administrative costs are kept low by giving each shareholder a water account. These accounts operate 
and look like a bank account. At the start of the water year, allocations are credited to a shareholder’s 
account. Use, as it occurs, is debited. As with a bank account, shareholders can log into their accounts 
and transfer unused allocations to someone else. 
As with money, water saving is encouraged. Every shareholder is given the opportunity to decide 
whether or not to use allocations, transfer them, or save them for use in a subsequent year. When 
unused allocations are carried forward to the next year, adjustment is made only for hydrological 
losses. 
Managing	  Third-­‐Party	  Impacts	  
The water sharing approach summarized above is sometimes known as an “unbundled” approach 
because core components of the allocation and use management systems are separated from one 
another. 
In an unbundled system, the potentially adverse impacts of some forms of water use on third parties 
are managed using a separate instrument. To this end, groundwater users are allowed to take 
groundwater from a well if and only if they hold a valid groundwater use permit. The conditions set 
out in these permits include the arrangements necessary to prevent adverse third-party effects from 
occurring. 
A typical groundwater use permit would authorize the taking of groundwater from a nominated well, 
stipulate how the volume taken will be estimated, nominate the water account from which this volume 
will be deducted, and nominate what penalties will apply if permit conditions are breached. When 
necessary, local draw-down effects are managed by setting a maximum daily pumping rate. 
Maximum pumping rates can also be used to prevent seawater intrusion or the movement of 
contaminated plumes. 
System-wide third-party effects are managed through decision-making rules set out in a groundwater 
sustainability plan. Often it is more efficient to divide a groundwater resource—often called a basin—
into a number of management zones. Within a zone, the nature of each share is identical. A standard 
set of groundwater use permit conditions is prepared for each zone. 
The	  Plan	  
System-wide third-party effects, such as unacceptable rates of drawdown, are managed at the system 
level by using processes set out in the system’s sustainability plan. These arrangements include the 
processes to be followed when deciding how much groundwater should be periodically allocated to 
each shareholder, how fast such allocations can be reduced, and how the unused allocations are to be 
protected. 
These same plans are used to determine annual allocations per share, the rules for varying these 
allocations, carryforward, and so forth. 
The	  Roadmap	  
Developed in consultation with local water users and managers, the appendix contains a generic 
roadmap for the development of groundwater sharing systems in California whose detail requires 
modification to suit local circumstances. 
The roadmap is drafted in a form that, with amendment to take account of local conditions and 
addition of other required general materials, could be submitted as a groundwater sustainability plan 
to be approved by the Department of Water Resources. 
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There are two main differences between the roadmap and current departmental guidelines for the 
preparation of plans. The first difference is the emphasis on the administrative and regulatory 
arrangements necessary to ensure successful implementation. The second is a much simpler approach 
to the collection and use of information. 
Rather than putting early emphasis into estimation of sustainable yield and so on, the roadmap 
suggests that priority should be given to developing the administrative systems necessary to build 
confidence in and encourage acceptance of the new groundwater management system. Early 
consultation with the department is recommended. Meetings that we have had with departmental 
officials suggest that they would be pleased to receive a proposal from a groundwater sustainability 
agency  willing to test using a groundwater sharing system consistent with the roadmap set out in the 
appendix. 
Once approved by the department, the provisions in the plan would be binding on groundwater users 
and on the state. Opportunities to change the plan without due process and wide stakeholder 
engagement would be limited. 
Relationship	  of	  Roadmap	  to	  Existing	  Water	  Rights	  
The roadmap does not seek to extinguish existing groundwater rights. Rather, it places a sharing 
system over existing groundwater rights. To continue to extract groundwater from a well once a plan 
such as this has been approved and comes into full effect, it would be necessary to have an existing 
right and to comply with the provisions of the sharing system. 
Language	  
Discussions about options and the best way forward are likely to be easier if the terms used to 
describe the proposed “new” system are different from those used to describe the “current” system. 
To this end, it is suggested that all involved use terms like shares and allocations to describe the 
proposed “new system” and use established terms like water rights to describe elements of the current 
system. 
Governance	  
As local trust and timely decision making is important, it is suggested that the groundwater 
sustainability agencies required under SGMA begin the process of developing a plan by forming a 
small independent board to ensure that the proposed groundwater sharing system and plan has 
integrity and is designed and implemented successfully. 
To speed innovation and investment, it is suggested that the integrity and accuracy of the proposed 
share registers and water accounting systems be guaranteed as valid by the state. This is achieved by 
using a register rather than a paper trail to define ownership and making it clear that the only way to 
prove share ownership is to have one’s name recorded in the register. Similarly, any mortgage or 
other financial interest not recorded in the register would not be deemed a valid interest. 
Transition	  Arrangements	  
The roadmap contains a default share allocation mechanism and a suggested adjustment pathway. The 
default suggestion is that the initial share assignments and allocations be made so as to cause 
minimum disruption and offer greatest flexibility during the initial transition period. This is achieved 
by starting with a share distribution that approximates existing use and then transitioning to a “fairer” 
arrangement over a 10-year period. During the transition period, it is suggested that each community 
consider redistributing a proportion of each shareholding according to community perceptions of the 
fairest way to allocate shares. 
At the start, it is suggested that shareholders be given buffer allocations to allow them flexibility and 
that it be possible to carry forward unused allocations from year to year. In essence, this means that 
each groundwater user has considerable opportunity to decide how best to make the adjustments 
necessitated by SGMA. 
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Finally and in light of the value of conjunctive use arrangements, it is suggested that consideration be 
given to the merits of setting aside a drought reserve for allocation to shareholders in the case of the 
emergence of a severe surface water shortage. 
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INTRODUCTION	  
In 2014, California’s legislature passed a three-bill package that called on the California Department 
of Water Resources to categorize each of California’s 515 alluvial groundwater basins into one of four 
priorities and to put in place arrangements for those basins identified as either high or medium priority 
to progressively mitigate and ultimately eliminate six undesirable results from occurring.1 Known as 
the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA),2 it holds that depending on priority and 
possible status of critical overdraft, groundwater use in medium- and high-priority basins is to be 
brought into balance by either 2040 or 2042.3 
The Department of Water Resources, pursuant to C.W.C. § 10722.4 and §10933, employed the 
ranking methodology of the recently completed CASGEM Program to establish the initial basin 
prioritizations. Ultimately, 127 of the state’s basins were identified as being of medium or high 
priority.4 
A subset of 21 groundwater basins has since been designated as critically overdrafted (Figure 1). The 
act requires that groundwater use in these 21 basins be brought under a groundwater sustainability 
plan or set of plans by January 31, 2020. All other high-priority and medium-priority basins must be 
managed under a groundwater sustainability plan by January 31, 2022.5 
SGMA envisions that the required plans be developed by local groundwater sustainability agencies 
(GSAs). These agencies are a new form of administrative body in California, having only come into 
existence with the passage of SGMA. 
Prior to SGMA, only a handful of basins were extensively managed under the auspices of a governing 
authority, most of which resulted from an adjudication or special act of the legislature. SGMA gives 
these authorities de facto standing as their basins’ GSAs. In all other basins, eligible local agencies 
have until June 30, 2017, to notify the Department of Water Resources of their intent to form a GSA 
for part or all of a basin. 
As of January 2017, 237 entries have been posted by various entities and, with some overlap, have 
given notice of their desire to form a GSA.6 For basins where no one proposes to form a GSA or there 
is failure to produce a plan or coordinated group of plans for the entire basin, the responsibility for 
plan preparation ultimately passes to the State Water Resources Control Board. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/SGM_BasinPriority.cfm.	  
2	  Sustainable	  Groundwater	  Management	  Act	  (2014).	  See	  
http://groundwater.ca.gov/docs/2014%20Sustainable%20Groundwater%20Management%20Legislation%20with%202015
%20amends%201-­‐15-­‐2016.pdf.	  
3	  See	  https://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/2014_Sustainable_Groundwater_Management_Legislation_092914.pdf.	  
4	  CASGEM’s	  prioritization	  scheme	  takes	  into	  account	  major	  groundwater	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  total	  and	  public	  
supply	  wells,	  irrigated	  acreage,	  historic	  impacts	  of	  groundwater	  use,	  and	  the	  basin’s	  reliance	  on	  groundwater	  as	  a	  primary	  
water	  source.	  See	  http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/casgem/pdfs/CASGEM_Basin_Prioritization_Brochure.pdf.	  
5	  See	  http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/cod.cfm.	  
6	  See	  http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/gsa_table.cfm.	  
	  7	  
Figure	  1.	  Critically	  overdrafted	  groundwater	  basins	  in	  California,	  2016	  
 
Source:	  http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/pdfs/GW_basinsCriticalOverdraft_CA.pdf.	  
	  
A	  Blueprint	  
Building on ideas contained in A Blueprint for Development of Robust Water Allocation Systems in 
the Western United States,7 this report offers an implementation roadmap for consideration by those 
involved in forming these agencies. The report’s focus is on the architecture of the systems that each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  Nicholas	  Institute,	  Unbundling	  Water	  Rights:	  A	  Blueprint	  for	  Development	  of	  Robust	  Water	  Allocation	  Systems	  in	  the	  
Western	  United	  States,	  by	  M.D.	  Young,	  P.	  Culp,	  D.	  Deane,	  M.	  Doyle,	  C.	  Esau,	  T.	  Profeta,	  S.	  Routson,	  and	  D.	  Sunding,	  
Nicholas	  Institute	  Report	  15-­‐01	  (2015),	  https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_r_15-­‐01.pdf.	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GSA needs to put in place and takes readers through a search. This search is for the best way to 
transition toward the development of robust groundwater management arrangements. 
Alternative	  Approaches	  
SGMA offers each local community of groundwater users the opportunity to design its own 
management system.8 This report suggests that, rather than doing the minimum necessary to comply 
with SGMA, California groundwater users will be better off if they use this opportunity to transition 
toward a state-of-the-art water entitlement, allocation, and management system. 
Australia started a similar journey in the mid-1990s and now, some 25 years later, has a state-of-the-
art water entitlement and allocation system that is serving water users, local communities, and the 
environment well. Along the way, Australia made many expensive mistakes and learned many 
lessons.9 The central idea underpinning this report is that with attention to detail and avoidance of the 
mistakes Australia made, it is possible for California groundwater users to see SGMA as an 
opportunity rather than a threat. 
Robustness	  
SGMA opens up a new opportunity for California groundwater users. In the past and when faced with 
a water shortage, governments have typically mandated a reduction in water use, banned certain 
practices, and begun curtailing rights or deliveries. In other parts of the world, moratoriums have been 
placed on new development and, in some groundwater systems, on the deepening of wells. These 
solutions are blunt. In recognition of the folly of taking a blunt approach, SGMA has given local 
communities an option to find their own solutions and implement them. 
Robust institutional arrangements demonstrate an ability to function gracefully during periods of 
extreme stress and enable those dependent on them to recover gracefully. With careful attention to 
detail, their designers try to make them bulletproof. Typically, they are easy to describe. They carry a 
connotation of elegance and simplicity in structure. They are trusted and expected to work well in the 
worst water-supply conditions one can imagine.10 
Vision	  
Adding	  Value	  
When water management arrangements are flawed and there is uncertainty about the future, the value 
of an irrigated farm tends to be much less than otherwise would be the case. The corollary to this 
observation is the well-known proposition that the better management systems are, the greater the 
value of the water-dependent businesses and the legal entitlements associated with them will be. 
Conceptually, SGMA has created an opportunity to improve the value of groundwater rights in 
California. To do this, those GSAs taking up this opportunity could put a robust water entitlement and 
allocation system in place. Robust systems are characterized by their capacity to perform well in the 
face of exceptional circumstances, such as a millennium drought, and the expectation that they can 
withstand the test of time. 
Language	  
The language used in the previous paragraph, with its emphasis on the need for a new water 
entitlement and allocation system, is intentional. Early in the search for an improved way to manage 
Australia’s water resources, those leading the search decided to adopt a new set of terms and avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  If	  a	  local	  community	  does	  not	  establish	  a	  GSA	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	  or	  fails	  to	  prepare	  a	  groundwater	  sustainability	  plan	  in	  
the	  required	  time,	  the	  state	  is	  required	  to	  step	  in	  and	  impose	  a	  plan	  on	  the	  basin.	  See	  SGMA	  §10735	  and	  §10736.	  
9	  See	  M.D.	  Young,	  “Environmental	  Effectiveness	  and	  Economic	  Efficiency	  of	  Water	  Use	  in	  Agriculture:	  The	  Experience	  of	  
and	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Australian	  Water	  Reform	  Programme”	  (2010),	  www.oecd.org/water.	  
10	  See	  M.D.	  Young	  and	  J.C.	  McColl,	  “Robust	  Reform:	  The	  Case	  for	  a	  New	  Water	  Entitlement	  System	  for	  Australia,”	  
Australian	  Journal	  of	  Agricultural	  and	  Resource	  Economics	  36(2)(2003):	  225–34;	  M.D.	  Young	  and	  J.C.	  McColl,	  “Defining	  
Tradable	  Water	  Entitlements	  and	  Allocations:	  A	  Robust	  System,”	  Canadian	  Water	  Resource	  Journal	  30(1)(2005):	  65–72.	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talking loosely about “water rights” and the need to improve them. The new set of terms enabled all to 
compare the new system with the old system using dialogues that encouraged constructive discussion. 
Assisted by an ever-deepening drought and the reality that the existing old system was dysfunctional, 
political consensus for the need to transition to a new system that respected existing water rights soon 
emerged. 
Above all else, this report recommends the use of terms that enable discussion about differences 
between the current and proposed new regimes. 
Six	  Building	  Blocks	  
The remainder of this report offers a framework and then sets out a roadmap for the implementation 
of a robust groundwater management system consistent with SGMA. 
One of the aims of this report is to make it easier for groundwater sustainability agencies to 
understand the nature of the SGMA journey and what is required. The timelines proposed in the 
legislation are tight. We see two pathways forward. The first is to use the roadmap as a template that 
needs to be adapted to accommodate local considerations and current administrative arrangements. 
The second is to use the roadmap as a guiding checklist to assist in identifying factors that have to be 
considered. 
In essence, the suggested groundwater sharing system has six building blocks: 
(1)   The granting of shares to individual users in delineated zones in a manner similar to the way 
shares are issued to people with an interest in a company. 
(2)   The annual announcement of the volume of water allocations to be credited to each 
shareholder’s water account at the start of each season coupled with the debiting of 
allocations from each account as water is used. 
(3)   A requirement that any groundwater user hold a permit that allows groundwater to be 
extracted from a well only when the water account associated with the well is in positive 
balance. 
(4)   The preparation of clear management plans—a groundwater sustainability plan—that set up 
a regulatory and administrative framework for managing water use in a groundwater basin on 
a zone-by-zone basis. 
(5)   Appointment of independent basin authorities with the skills and knowledge to make the 
timely decisions necessary to ensure efficient and effective use of water at the local level. 
(6)   Administrative arrangements that allow the speedy, low-cost trading of shares and 
allocations without fear that the process will become entangled in expensive legal argument. 
Legal	  Structure	  
As is the case with fishery share systems, tradable development rights, and carbon emissions trading 
schemes now used in California and elsewhere, it is recommended that these six building blocks be 
placed on top of existing groundwater rights as a regulatory overlay. That is, it is recommended that 
no attempt be made to extinguish or replace existing groundwater rights. Rather, it is suggested that 
the proposed sharing system sit alongside existing rights and entitlements. 
Once the proposed sharing system is put in place, land owners will be required to both hold a water 
right and comply with a new set of groundwater sharing regulations developed by a GSA in 
consultation with local water users. To this end, the roadmap contains a clause that states any land 
owners who comply with an approved groundwater sustainability plan may do so without 
compromising their current rights. 
When approved, provided it is written in a regulatory style, a plan would gain legal status similar to 
any other regulations made by the Department of Water Resources. The result is a suite of 
administrative arrangements that would be binding on all the basin’s groundwater users and on the 
state. 
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Unbundling	  
Academics describe the sharing system suggested in this report as an “unbundled” system. In some 
legal circles, a property right is described as a bundle of sticks or features that can be pulled apart. 
Unbundling is the name given to a regulatory structure where each stick is defined separately. The 
result is a structure that makes speedy adjustment possible as each feature can be dealt without 
compromise to issues that operate at different scales, in different locations, and in different time 
periods. The simple guideline is that there must be at least one instrument—or stick—for each 
objective or issue of concern. When unbundling, it is critical that each instrument be defined in a 
manner that has hydrological integrity. There must, for example, be no “paper water” left in the 
system.11 
In addition to unbundling, which reduces transaction costs, the suggested regime seeks to add 
elements known to increase the value of each share and each allocation in a way that makes even 
minute savings and trades worthwhile. This is achieved primarily by 
•   Putting in place local, apolitical governance structures capable of making final allocation and 
trading decisions as quickly as circumstances change; 
•   Guaranteeing the integrity of share registers and water accounts; 
•   Making it easy to mortgage shares and use shares as collateral to enable new forms of 
investment; 
•   Making it possible to transfer allocations from one water account to another at very low cost 
and without any risk that a third party may attempt to undo such a transfer; 
•   Encouraging and effectively permitting people to save water and carry unused groundwater 
forward from one year to the next; 
•   Significantly reducing the risk that groundwater use will end up in the courts and require 
investment in expensive litigation processes; and 
•   Allowing aquifers to be used as a reservoir for the storage of both surface and groundwater. 
The	  Roadmap	  
The appendix contains a generic roadmap for consideration by groundwater sustainability agencies 
and the local groundwater users they represent. Written in plain English, the roadmap seeks to map 
out the flavor of a groundwater sustainability plan based on the proposed sharing system, which could 
be submitted by a groundwater sustainability agency to the Department of Water Resources for 
approval. Some have described it as a template; others see it as a guide. Both assessments are correct. 
The next part of this report describes some of the rationale behind each section of the roadmap. This is 
followed by two hypothetical discussions of what might happen in a typified coastal basin and a 
typified Central Valley basin, were they to implement a plan based off the roadmap. Some broader 
state-wide considerations and opportunities are raised in the last section. 
Those who have not already done so are advised to at least glance at the roadmap before reading 
further. One of our aims in preparing this report is to make it easier for local communities to 
understand what is required under SGMA and think through what would otherwise seem like a 
daunting agenda. We hope that by doing this, ultimately, SGMA will be seen as a process that has 
added value rather than reduced opportunity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  “Paper	  water”	  is	  water	  that	  cannot	  be	  found	  anywhere	  other	  than	  on	  paper.	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  
unbundling	  see	  M.D.	  Young,	  "Designing	  Water	  Abstraction	  Regimes	  for	  an	  Ever-­‐Changing	  and	  Ever-­‐Varying	  Future,"	  
Agricultural	  Water	  Management	  145(2014):32–38.	  doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2013.12.002. 
	  
	  11	  
Groundwater	  Sustainability	  Plans	  
In most basins, local authorities are in the process of forming their groundwater sustainability 
agencies (GSAs). The roadmap is designed to help those involved in forming a GSA see what a final 
version of the plan they are required to prepare might look like. Its focus is on administrative 
structures, outcomes, decision-making processes, regulatory processes, and day-to-day operations. 
There is a big difference between appointing an agency and trusting those appointed to work out what 
to do and going to a community with a clear, detailed vision. A community that goes to its members 
with a plan to establish a GSA with a view to implementing a robust groundwater-sharing system 
might find it much easier to garner support—especially because of SGMA’s demanding timeline. 
The roadmap attempts to build on the guidelines that the Department of Water Resources has been 
discussing with local communities and the general vision espoused by SGMA, namely, that 
“sustainable groundwater management is best achieved locally through the development, 
implementation, and updating of plans and programs based on the best available science.”12 A set of 
regulations, decision-making rules, and administrative processes are presented as options for 
consideration. All are designed to build trust and confidence. If local communities and the department 
can sign off on this framework, much of the detail can be left to locally employed people. 
The roadmap adds governance and administrative considerations to the array of best management 
practices that were identified and drafted by the Department of Water Resources.13 
SGMA identifies a need to avoid six “significant and unreasonable” undesirable results: (1)	  depletion 
of groundwater levels, (2) reduction of groundwater storage, (3) land subsidence, (4) potentially 
adverse impacts on surface water use, (5) seawater intrusion, and (6) degradation of water quality.14  
The roadmap has been prepared in a manner that can put in place a suite of processes that will enable 
the avoidance of these undesired results within the required timeframe. If a plan commits to a set of 
regulatory arrangements that can reasonably be expected to deliver the outcomes required by SGMA 
and progress is confirmed in an annual report, then much more of the detail can be left to local people. 
Departmental agreement to ratify plans similar to the roadmap can be expected to produce the 
outcomes required by SGMA at much less cost than many of the detailed reporting requirements 
under consideration. In particular, there may be no need to prepare and submit lots of detailed 
information about aquifer form and function and the state of local knowledge about each aquifer 
where the plan is designed to adapt to address deficits in the basin’s water balance based on 
representative monitoring and groundwater levels.15 
The proposed water sharing and allocation system couples incentives for water conservation and 
rewards innovation with arrangements that make trading possible. In particular, the structure of the 
proposed water-accounting system makes possible low-cost trading of water allocations and shares. 
The proposed planning system also puts in place a suite of administrative and consultation 
arrangements that protect local groundwater users from sudden changes in the amount of groundwater 
they may access. If a community, a court, or the state wishes to stop something from occurring, it 
must amend the basin plan, which can be done only through due process. Decisions made in a manner 
consistent with an approved plan cannot be undone. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  C.W.C.	  §113.	  
13	  See	  http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/bmps.cfm.	  
14	  See	  SGMA	  §10721(x).	  
15	  Of	  particular	  mention	  is	  the	  leeway	  offered	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Water	  Resources	  in	  its	  GSP	  Emergency	  Regulations	  
§354.28(d)	  and	  §354.36	  to	  monitor	  basins,	  assess	  minimum	  thresholds,	  and	  evaluate	  sustainability	  indicators	  using	  
representative	  monitoring	  and	  groundwater	  elevations	  as	  a	  reasonable	  proxy.	  See	  
http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/pdfs/GSP_Emergency_Regulations.pdf.	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THE	  PLAN	  
Framework	  
This report suggests that each groundwater sustainability agency put in place a new set of regulations 
that enable the management of groundwater use on a day-to-day basis by an independent, skills-based 
authority. 
As well as setting up the necessary governance and administrative arrangements, these plans should 
also set up the rules for determining how much total water can be extracted from an aquifer, how 
access and use of this water is to be managed, and how the required transition to balanced use is to be 
achieved. 
As can be seen from the length of the roadmap in the appendix, these plans need not be long. 
Plan	  Objectives	  
To gain acceptance at the community level, a groundwater sustainability plan needs to encourage 
economically efficient water use and investment, incentivize conservation, facilitate continuous 
adjustment, make it possible for new uses and new businesses to emerge, make best use of local 
information, and ensure equitable access. 
It is therefore suggested that the six undesirable results be grouped under a single sustainability 
objective and matched with other objectives designed to ensure that groundwater use and conservation 
maximize opportunities to contribute to local and regional development. That is, the planning 
approach suggested is one that takes local social and economic considerations into account. 
As a basis for discussion, the roadmap suggests a generic set of six objectives: 
•   Avoid the six undesirable results and minimize the risk they might cause to occur. 
•   Encourage economically efficient groundwater use and investment. 
•   Encourage water users and investors to search for ways to conserve water. 
•   Facilitate continuous adjustment as water supply and demand conditions change. 
•   Provide fair and equitable access to water for domestic purposes. 
•   Maintain local control of groundwater management. 
SGMA sets one further constraint. Depending on the status of the basin, groundwater use has to be 
brought into balance by either 2040 or 2042. The roadmap suggests that this requirement be referred 
to as the plan’s sustainability goal. That is, the plan should pursue its primary goal but do so with 
careful attention to objectives of importance to local communities. 
Keeping	  It	  Simple	  and	  Affordable	  
Rather than spending large amounts of money in an attempt to build complex hydrological models 
and climatic predictions, the roadmap suggests an iterative approach that can be implemented rapidly 
and adapted as knowledge about each aquifer improves, inflows occur, and groundwater use practices 
change. 
In the early stage of plan implementation, a simple set of allocation rules may be all that is needed to 
bring about a transition to a feasible regulatory structure. 
Instead of putting a massive amount of money into the development of models that seek to estimate a 
conclusive, frozen value for “sustainable yield,” it is suggested that the journey toward achieving the 
sustainability goal be made using decision-making rules determined by the average depth to 
groundwater monitored at carefully chosen sites. The question of how many sites or wells to monitor 
is a local matter. 
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If average depth to groundwater at these sites declines, the allocation made to shareholders in the zone 
where water levels are declining must be reduced.16 The roadmap makes it clear that no one can be 
guaranteed access to a perpetually static volume of water. Water supply involves risk, and those risks 
have to be managed. 
In many cases, refinement of estimates of sustainable yield and other factors can be left until after the 
basic structures and processes are in place. In practice, the commitment is to transition to a set of 
allocation arrangements that, by 2040 or 2042, can be expected to keep the mean depth to 
groundwater within a predefined band.  
Avoiding	  Massive	  Disruption	  
The proposed water supply allocation pathway is designed to give all existing groundwater users time 
to adjust. 
When the sharing system first comes into full operation, the roadmap suggests that each water user be 
given an allocation equivalent to the maximum amount they used in the previous five years and a 
start-up buffer that can be carried forward from year to year with adjustment for losses. In addition, 
for the first two years, the plan requires that allocations per share per year not be reduced by more 
than 1.5% per annum. 
As the plan is implemented, it is suggested that the practice of setting an upper limit on reductions 
continue so that all groundwater users can plan with confidence. In practice, the result is an 
“allocation band” that constrains basin authority decisions. How tight or narrow to make this band is a 
matter for community consideration and consultation. 
Figure 2 shows a mock-up of the total annual volume of allocations made in a hypothetical area where 
the current take is in the vicinity of 100,000 acre-feet. At the time the plan was put in place, it was 
expected that use would need to be reduced to 55,000 acre-feet. Along the way, however, it was 
realized that use only needed to be reduced to 60,000 acre-feet (the modelers had it wrong). All users 
start with a buffer so that no water users start with access to less than they have been using. That is, 
groundwater users are given time to understand how the new system will “really” work, to plan, and 
to start to adjust. In practice, this means that allocations per share are higher in early years and less in 
later years. But with a buffer, water users are free to choose when they use the water they can expect 
to receive over the full transitional period. 
In 2029, an agency-funded groundwater augmentation project gets underway and, as a result, there is 
an increase in the volume of allocations made per share. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  At	  least	  three	  or	  four	  wells	  need	  to	  be	  monitored	  per	  management	  zone	  at	  the	  same	  time	  every	  year.	  See	  section	  
“Aquifers	  and	  Management	  Zones”	  on	  page	  21	  for	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  management	  zones.	  See	  footnote	  15	  for	  a	  
fuller	  explanation	  of	  permitted	  basin	  monitoring	  via	  proxy.	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Figure	  2.	  Key	  features	  of	  suggested	  arrangements	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  groundwater	  as	  arrangements	  are	  put	  in	  
place	  to	  bring	  use	  within	  sustainable	  limits	  
	  
Drought	  Preparedness	  through	  Adjustment,	  Carryforward,	  and	  Transfers	  
The sharing system in the roadmap has been prepared in a manner that encourages all water users to 
plan for dramatic changes in supply and demand conditions. In particular, with adjustment for 
hydrological losses, groundwater account holders are given the opportunity to carry forward unused 
groundwater from one year to the next. They are also granted the opportunity to speedily trade 
groundwater allocations with one another and use the value of any shares they hold to finance 
installation and development of water-saving technologies. 
In short, each plan should be seen as one of the region’s key instruments for managing drought. In 
light of this, the roadmap suggests that it should not be possible to suspend a plan by reason of the fact 
that a drought has caused the declaration of a state of emergency. 
When one looks carefully at the individual implications of an adjustment strategy, such as the one 
suggested in Figure 2, the presence of an initial start-up buffer coupled with a guaranteed opportunity 
to carry forward unused allocations means that each groundwater user is given considerable 
flexibility. 
Pursuing	  the	  Sustainability	  Goal	  
Each GSA is required to achieve its sustainability goal by 2040 or 2042. The roadmap does this by 
requiring the basin authority to control the rate by which groundwater users are assigned permission 
to extract water. To assist them in doing this, the roadmap requires that for each zone the basin 
authority set (1) an average maximum depth that acknowledges that groundwater stocks can be used 
as a buffer and should be expected to go up and down and (2) a preferred maximum depth to force all 
to recognize that it is time to carefully review and reconsider how much water should be allocated. 
These limits are designed to trigger community discussion about how much water to allocate to each 
shareholder and how previous decisions constrain future decisions. SGMA requires that by 2040 or 
2042, the average depth to groundwater is expected to have stopped declining. The disparity between 
these depths will likely vary from basin to basin and depend on the allocation rules put in place by the 
basin authority. These rules will likely be based on the authority’s adherence to SGMA’s 
sustainability goals, responsibility to overlying stakeholders, and stewarding of the basin for accessing 
shareholders. 
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In recognition that communities need to achieve the sustainability goal and avoid undesirable results, 
the roadmap also proposes an absolute maximum depth. The purpose of this absolute maximum is to 
make it clear that ultimately groundwater use has to be brought within sustainable limits. 
When the absolute limit is reached, the basin authority is required to declare that the annual allocation 
to be made to each shareholder will be zero. When it makes such a declaration, however, access 
would still be allowed to unused allocations that have been carried forward and domestic water users 
would still be allowed to take enough water to meet essential household needs. 
Governance	  
When deciding whom to appoint to make decisions about water use, there are two basic approaches. 
Individuals are appointed either because of their perceived ability to represent the organization that 
nominates them or because of the skill and expertise that they would bring to the table. 
Representative governance systems have a high degree of accountability. Members are often sent to 
meetings with “instructions” to pursue outcomes preferred by their organizations or constituents. 
When members fail to achieve these particular outcomes, they might be dismissed through votes of no 
confidence or elections. The alternative approach is more skills based in style. This latter approach 
focuses on the benefits of ensuring that the decision-making body has the necessary skills to make 
timely, well-informed decisions and resolves issues in a manner that ensures closure so that 
stakeholders dependent on the decision can act with subsequent confidence. In systems that operate 
under skills-based appointment, much care is taken to avoid appointing individuals seen to hold 
conflicts of interest as this might undermine general trust in the body. Those appointed are expected to 
make apolitical decisions in the best interests of all. 
Recognizing the merits of both approaches, the roadmap suggests that California groundwater users 
will be served best by an approach that combines the advantages of representativeness with skills-
based decision-making structures. 
It is suggested that those local organizations electing to establish a groundwater sustainability agency 
initially form the general vision and overall framework of the plan. It is then recommended that these 
agencies establish themselves as a permanent committee whose prime role is to appoint people to a 
five-member skills-based basin authority responsible for preparing a final plan and putting in place 
the necessary arrangements to enable cost-effective implementation. Accountability within this 
structure is multifaceted. Member-agencies of the GSA are accountable to their constituents and 
members of the authority accountable to the GSA as a whole but not to any subgroup of groundwater 
users. 
A capacity to make timely, final decisions is particularly important—as is a sense of trust. If, for 
example, California experiences something similar to Australia’s decade-long Millennium Drought, 
where surface water supplies fail, then one would expect a basin authority to be able to act quickly. A 
small, expertise-based basin authority can be expected to make decisions in a manner that enables 
groundwater users to respond rapidly and, in particular, to modify their personal water use and even 
land-use decisions in days. 
The cost of administration is also an issue. The smaller the authority, the less it should cost to run.17 
Basin	  Authorities	  
As a general rule, the members of a small, expertise-based authority should be expected to defend any 
decision the authority takes. If a member is seen publicly to disagree with a decision made, they can 
be expected to resign. Above all else, it is critical that all members of an authority are seen to be 
working as a coherent team, each benefiting and learning from each other’s expertise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Some	  communities	  might	  like	  to	  include	  fiscal	  prudence	  in	  the	  list	  of	  objectives	  they	  seek	  to	  pursue.	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It is well known in the corporate world that the quality of decision-making starts to decline when the 
number of people involved in making a decision increases beyond between five and seven members.18 
It is also well known that life for a chief executive officer is easier if the task is to implement the 
board’s decisions. 
In recognition of all these considerations, the roadmap suggests that the agencies initially forming the 
groundwater sustainability agency consider the best way to appoint people to their basin authority and 
review their performance (Figure 3). 
The roadmap suggests that if a substantial majority of members of the GSA or the Department of 
Water Resources are dissatisfied with the performance of one or more members of the authority, it be 
possible to dismiss them and, in extreme circumstances, appoint an administrator to take over until 
new members can be appointed. As it is likely that some shareholders will not be associated with any 
of the agencies on the GSA, it is also suggested that it be possible for a substantial majority of 
shareholders to dismiss members of the authority by a vote of more than 60% of all basin shareholders 
or of the shareholders representing more than 70% of the shares in the basin. 
So that the system can be expected to continue to function while members are being replaced, it is 
suggested that the authority be responsible for appointing its watermaster, whose task, under the 
direction of the elected members, would be to build the systems necessary to give effect to a plan 
similar to that described in the roadmap. 
The roadmap suggests that basin authorities consist of  
•   A chair with strong leadership and communication skills  
•   Four independent members whose collective expertise would enable them to resolve all the 
legal, financial management, communication, impact assessment, hydrological, and 
environmental issues likely to come before them  
•   A watermaster. 
Figure	  3.	  Conceptual	  structure	  of	  GSA	  governance	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Using	  empirical	  data	  from	  a	  survey	  of	  over	  2,700	  U.K.	  companies,	  for	  example,	  Guest	  concludes,	  “Our	  results	  are	  
somewhat	  inconclusive	  on	  the	  precise	  identification	  of	  an	  optimal	  board	  size	  since	  this	  differs	  by	  performance	  measure,	  
although	  we	  can	  reasonably	  conclude	  that	  it	  is	  less	  than	  ten	  members.”	  See	  P.	  Guest,	  “The	  Impact	  of	  Board	  Size	  on	  Firm	  
Performance:	  Evidence	  from	  the	  UK,”	  European	  Journal	  of	  Finance	  15(4)(2009):	  385–404.	  The	  quotation	  appears	  on	  page	  
23	  of	  the	  version	  available	  at	  
https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/bitstream/1826/4169/4/The_impact_of_board_size_on_firm_performance.pdf.	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To ensure continuity of knowledge, it is suggested that members initially be appointed for one, two, 
three, four, or five years. Reappointment would be possible. Appointed by the basin authority, the 
watermaster would be an ex officio member and not have a vote. The watermaster’s main 
responsibility would be to ensure that the authority’s plan is implemented in its entirety. 
Avoiding	  Conflicts	  of	  Interest	  and	  Insider	  Trading	  
From time to time, there will be a need for the basin authority to make decisions that have market 
consequences. In addition, it is important for members of the authority to be able to make balanced 
decisions and not feel any obligation to represent the viewpoint of a subset of water users. To this end, 
it is suggested, as a draft for consideration, that members of the authority should not have a direct 
interest in using more than five acre-feet of water per year in the basin they are involved in governing 
and should not hold more than 1% of the shares in any of the basin’s zones.19 
By limiting the size of any basin authority member’s direct interest, there is little opportunity for them 
to be involved in insider trading. Insider trading is possible if any other person can gain preferential 
access to, for example, the size of an annual allocation decision. If this is not possible, then it may be 
necessary to suspend trading while decisions that could result in insider trading are made. Insider 
trading risks are reduced further by widely publicizing the fact that the authority is about to make such 
a decision. 
The roadmap suggests that the basin authority be allowed to meet in private when considering issues 
that might change the value of shares or allocations. If this option is taken, then one would expect the 
basin authority subsequently to announce its decision in a manner that enables all shareholders and 
other water users to profit equally from the announcement.20  
If, for example, the authority is considering making a top-up allocation to ease pressure on surface 
water supplies, then it would be important for all shareholders and all water users to be able to 
discover this fact at the same time. 
Prior to making such a decision, one would expect an authority to engage with all stakeholders and 
encourage them to contribute to the decision-making process. 
Reviews	  and	  Plan	  Amendments	  
The proposed authority’s main task would be to prepare a plan and, once it has been approved, ensure 
its successful implementation. 
As unexpected changes in water supply and demand conditions will occur, there is also a provision for 
the basin authority to review and amend a plan when conditions justify an unscheduled review. The 
roadmap also suggests a review of the plan immediately before full implementation and every five 
years thereafter. 
Public	  Participation	  and	  Engagement	  
In water resource management, especially in regions where there is access to both surface and 
groundwater, it is important to be able to revise operating rules as quickly as supply and demand 
conditions change. This is possible only within the constraints established in the plan. To prevent 
decisions from undermining shareholder confidence, any changes to the plan may only be made after 
the basin authority has given all stakeholders an opportunity to comment on the proposed change and 
to suggest other changes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  These	  numbers	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  indicative	  of	  what	  is	  needed	  to	  ensure	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  conflict	  of	  interest.	  
These	  arrangements	  would,	  for	  example,	  not	  preclude	  a	  GSA	  from	  appointing	  a	  person	  with	  substantial	  holdings	  in	  another	  
basin.	  	  
20	  That	  is,	  to	  the	  extent	  possible,	  the	  basin	  authority	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Brown	  Act.	  If	  this	  proves	  
impossible,	  then	  the	  authority	  would	  need	  to	  advise	  all	  that	  it	  is	  about	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  that	  could	  affect	  market	  values	  
and,	  if	  necessary,	  suspend	  trading	  while	  the	  decision	  is	  made.	  
	  18	  
Specifically, the roadmap requires that plan amendment deliberations begin with extensive local 
engagement and be followed with the release of a draft amendment before any formal proposal for 
change is submitted to the Department of Water Resources. 
Ratifying	  an	  Amendment	  
In the interests of expediency, the roadmap suggests that a plan allow amendment to any of its 
annexes without requiring such an amendment to be ratified by the Department of Water Resources. 
For amendments to the body of the plan, rather than setting up a culture of top-down approval, the 
roadmaps structure suggests that it be the role of the department to ratify (rather than approve) 
amendments to the plan so that the amendments gain the same regulatory status as the original plan.21 
That is, the roadmap is designed to maximize a sense of local autonomy. To this end, the proposed 
final sign-off process forces the department to approve proposed changes to the plan in a timely 
manner. This is achieved via the following procedure: 
(1)   Basin authority announcement of a decision to consider amending the plan. 
(2)   A call for comments and submissions followed by a thorough public engagement process. 
(3)   Preparation and exhibition of the proposed amendment as a draft. 
(4)   Formal consideration of any comments received on the draft. 
(5)   A final decision on the nature of the amendment it wishes the department to ratify. 
(6)   Consistent with SGMA, submission of the final amendment to the department for ratification 
so that the amendment becomes binding under California law. 
(7)   A legal arrangement that ensures automatic ratification unless the department returns it to the 
basin authority for further consideration within 30 days. 
(8)   Should the department return the amendment to the basin authority for further consideration 
and amendment, a final step that requires the department to either ratify the newly considered 
version of the amendment within 30 days or arrange for an administrator to take over the 
functions of the basin authority. 
(9)   Failure of the department to respond or appoint an administrator within 30 days results in the 
automatic approval of the amendment. 
To be specific, when the Department of Water Resources first approves a plan consistent with the 
roadmap, it is proposed that the department agrees to respond to any requests to amend a plan in a 
timely manner and to waive its legislated entitlement to take up to two years to respond. 
Aquifers	  and	  Management	  Zones	  
Early on in the development of a water sharing plan, each basin authority will need to determine how 
many management zones and aquifers it will need to recognize.22 As a guiding rule, each aquifer 
should be defined and managed separately. That is, if there is an unconfined aquifer and a confined 
aquifer, the boundaries to each should be defined separately and shares issued in each. 
A second issue is the size of each zone. As a guiding rule, each subbasin should be as large as 
possible so that opportunities to trade allocations are maximized. For this to occur, the size of each 
zone should be such that the 1:1 trading of allocations is possible. That is, there is a tradeoff to be 
made between connectivity and size. Quite large zones can be established when aquifers are 
continuous. In fractured aquifers, every trade may need to be subject to careful assessment. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  If	  the	  prime	  function	  of	  the	  department	  is	  to	  ratify	  that	  a	  decision	  has	  been	  made	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  all,	  then	  there	  is	  
a	  strong	  expectation	  that	  the	  basin	  authority	  will	  have	  already	  made	  the	  “right”	  decision.	  When	  something	  is	  submitted	  for	  
“approval,”	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  further	  negotiation	  can	  occur.	  The	  department	  approves	  the	  plan	  the	  first	  time	  it	  is	  
submitted.	  Thereafter,	  amendments	  are	  ratified.	  
22	  In	  the	  roadmap,	  the	  term	  management	  zone	  is	  used	  in	  preference	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Water	  Resources–defined	  
“management	  area”	  (GSP	  Emergency	  Regulations	  §351(r))	  due	  to	  the	  dynamic	  ability	  of	  such	  a	  term	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  both	  
two-­‐dimensional	  (e.g.,	  surface	  area)	  and	  three-­‐dimensional	  space	  (e.g.,	  aquifers).	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roadmap contains a suggested set of rules for modifying zone boundaries, transferring shares and 
allocations from one basin to another, and extending a basin to cover a larger area.23 
Water	  Sharing	  
In most California groundwater basins, groundwater use has been relatively unrestricted.24 Until 
SGMA, most aspiring groundwater users needed only to apply for permission to drill a well, certify 
that drilling the well would not contaminate the underlying aquifer, obtain the relevant permit, drill 
the well, install the necessary equipment, and start pumping. Land parcel owners were then free to 
take as much water from the area under their land as they liked. 
In the early stages of groundwater development in California, open, unfettered access caused few 
problems. Both formal and informal practices of conjunctive use also permitted many aquifers to be 
heavily drawn on in some years while naturally recharged in others. But improved pumping and 
irrigation technology and increased demand have begun to produce an array of results that have been 
identified by SGMA as “undesirable.” 
Simple restrictions on groundwater pumping could be used to prevent undesirable results but, if 
implemented, would come at a very high cost. An order requiring every groundwater user to apply for 
less than two acre-feet per acre, for example, could be used to reduce groundwater use but would 
make the production of many crops impossible unless they were produced by drawing on a mixture of 
surface and groundwater sources. 
Rather than taking this extremely restrictive approach, the roadmap suggests that both groundwater 
users and local communities will be better off if limits on overall basin groundwater use are coupled 
with opportunities for people to profit from saving water and searching for ways to use it more 
efficiently. This is achieved primarily by putting in place a groundwater sharing system that involves: 
•   Issuing shares to land parcel owners;25 
•   Making volumetric allocations in proportion to the number of shares held; 
•   Putting in place simple yet trusted systems for share registering, water accounting, and water 
use monitoring; and 
•   Requiring all groundwater users to hold a permit requiring them to comply with specific 
conditions, including a requirement to extract water only when their groundwater account is 
in positive balance. 
The separated nature of this regulatory structure—called an unbundled system in academic circles—
allows opportunity for the development of low-cost administrative structures and rapid response to 
changing conditions. 
One of the key design aspects is an increase in the degree of fungibility of each component.26 In 
particular, each share is identical and, hence, there is no opportunity for a third party to intervene with 
a view to stopping the transfer of a share from one person to another. The same applies to volumetric 
allocations. Within any zone, each allocation is identical and the transfer of allocations from one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  When	  in	  doubt,	  the	  pragmatic	  advice	  is	  to	  start	  small	  and	  increase	  the	  size	  of	  a	  zone	  or	  combine	  it	  with	  an	  adjoining	  zone	  
at	  a	  later	  stage.	  
24	  Notable	  exceptions	  prior	  to	  SGMA	  include	  adjudicated	  basins	  and	  basins	  managed	  by	  special	  districts	  enacted	  by	  the	  
California	  legislature.	  
25	  In	  cases	  involving	  municipal	  purveyors,	  industrial	  users,	  etc.,	  who	  have	  a	  long-­‐standing	  arrangement	  entitling	  access	  to	  a	  
well	  located	  on	  land	  owned	  by	  someone	  else,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  issue	  shares	  either	  directly	  to	  the	  user	  or,	  
alternatively,	  to	  the	  landholder	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  be	  transferred	  immediately	  to	  the	  user	  at	  no	  charge.	  
26	  Fungibility	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  all	  items	  in	  a	  market	  are	  tradable.	  U.S.	  dollar	  notes	  are	  very	  fungible.	  Provided	  they	  are	  
not	  counterfeit,	  they	  are	  nearly	  the	  same	  and	  mutually	  exchangeable	  on	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  basis.	  Every	  one	  of	  them	  is	  worth	  
one	  dollar.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  surface	  water	  right	  issued	  in	  1896	  for	  the	  use	  of	  3,000	  acre-­‐feet	  at	  the	  place	  where	  two	  rivers	  
meet	  is	  unique	  in	  virtually	  all	  its	  characteristics.	  In	  essence,	  most	  surface	  water	  rights	  in	  California	  are	  about	  as	  infungible	  
as	  they	  can	  get.	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account to another done at a one-to-one ratio. Consideration and management of potentially adverse 
effects on third parties is achieved by placing conditions on groundwater use permits. For this reason, 
we focus the next section of this report on groundwater use permits. 
Groundwater	  Use	  Permits	  
From the perspective of a land parcel owner, the proposed regulatory system would require the owner 
of any land parcel to ensure that any person taking water from that parcel do so only in a manner 
consistent with the conditions set out in a groundwater use permit attached to the land parcel. That is, 
land parcel owners are the only legal entity that can hold such a permit, and they are responsible for 
ensuring compliance with it. 
Under a plan similar to the roadmap, each groundwater use permit would contain a link to a water 
account from which the watermaster would deduct water allocations as water is extracted from a well 
and require that the extraction of groundwater only be permitted when the water account has a 
positive balance. Groundwater use permits would be issued only to legal entities recorded in a 
county’s assessor’s parcel number database and always be associated with a specific assessor’s parcel 
number. It would be the responsibility of the owner of the land parcel to ensure that any tenant 
complies with the permit’s conditions. 
Groundwater use permits can also be used to control adverse local effects and third-party 
considerations. If, for example, the proximity of one well to another necessitated controls on the 
pumping rate due to the adverse effects resulting from a wide cone of depression, the permit might set 
a limit on the amount of water that may be extracted per day, week, or month so as to prevent the 
emergence of an unreasonable cone of depression. 
This same regulatory mechanism can be used to limit extraction from land parcels close to the sea 
where, if too much water is taken, seawater can intrude into an aquifer. It can also be used to prevent 
pumping near plumes in a manner that causes the plume to migrate. 
In essence, groundwater use permits have two primary functions. The first requires its holder to keep 
the water account associated with it in nonnegative balance. The second enables the regulation and 
prevention of adverse local effects. In recognition of this latter function, the roadmap suggests that 
watermasters take great care when issuing groundwater use permits and only do so when they are 
confident that they have taken all adjoining landholder concerns fully into account. 
Water	  Accounts	  
With the exception of domestic and de minimis groundwater users, the roadmap requires all 
groundwater users to hold a water account and keep it in nonnegative balance. One month before the 
commencement of each water year, the basin authority would announce the total volume of water to 
be made available to shareholders and when these allocations will be credited to each account. As 
soon as these allocations are credited to a water account, each shareholder is free to use it, transfer 
their water to another account, or save it for a “nonrainy” day. As water is extracted from a well, the 
estimated net volume extracted would be deducted from the relevant water account. Table 1 describes 
how this process of using, saving, and transferring allocations might look for a hypothetical 
shareholder. 
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Table	  1.	  Mock-­‐up	  of	  a	  water	  account	  held	  by	  a	  parcel	  holder	  in	  ABC	  Basina	  
Date	   Action	  or	  event	   Debit	   Credit	   Balance	  
1	  Oct	  2019	   Opening	  balance	   	   	   0.00	  
1	  Oct	  2019	   Start-­‐up	  buffer	  	   	   +83.33	   +83.33	  
1	  Oct	  2019	   Share	  allocation	  
10,000	  shares	  at	  one	  acre-­‐inch	  per	  share	  
	   +833.33	   +916.66	  
15	  Oct	  2019	   Net	  use—estimated	  using	  satellite	  
imagery	  and	  land	  parcel	  area	  
-­‐10	   	   +906.66	  
30	  Oct	  2019	   Net	  use—estimated	  using	  satellite	  
imagery	  and	  land	  parcel	  area	  
-­‐15	   	   +891.66	  
5	  Oct	  2019	   Within-­‐zone	  allocation	  transfer	  to	  M.D.	  
and	  S.M.	  Jones	  
-­‐50	   	   +841.66	  
20	  Nov	  2019	   Metered	  use	  taken	  for	  industrial	  water	  
use	  purposes	  on	  land	  parcel	  (six	  acre-­‐feet	  
with	  50%	  return	  following	  treatment	  in	  
septic	  system)	  
-­‐3	   	   +838.66	  
25	  Nov	  2019	   Purchase	  from	  D.	  Smith	  (Zone	  2)	  30	  acre-­‐
feet	  at	  0.8	  per	  acre-­‐foot	  
	   +24	   +862.66	  
28	  Dec	  2019	   Transfer	  to	  J.J.	  Esau	   -­‐70	   	   +792.66	  
30	  Mar	  2020	   Aquifer	  recharge	  using	  water	  sourced	  
from	  the	  state	  water	  project	  
	   +100	   +892.66	  
~	   	   	   	   ~	  
~	   	   	   	   ~	  
~	   	   	   	   ~	  
30	  Sept	  2020	   Closing	  balance	  at	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  
2019/20	  water	  year	  	  
	   	   +892.66	  
End	  of	  year	   Amount	  to	  be	  carried	  forward	  to	  the	  next	  
water	  year	  with	  10%	  adjustment	  for	  
losses	  
-­‐89.3	   	   +803.36	  
a	  ABC	  Basin	  Water	  Account	  2019/20	  Water	  Year	  commencing	  October	  1,	  2019.	  
J.D.	  and	  C.E.	  Wilson	  linked	  to	  Groundwater	  Use	  Permit	  #	  ZZ123456	  in	  Zone	  1.	  
As mentioned above, with adjustment for losses, any unused groundwater allocation can be carried 
forward from one water year to the next.27 As with a bank account, access to each water account 
would be restricted to the watermaster and people authorized by the account holder. The watermaster 
could, however, release aggregated data so that all users could quickly determine how much 
groundwater was left in each zone. As a bare minimum, everyone should be able to discover how 
much groundwater is still available for use. 
When it comes to allocation trading, account holders would need to decide whether or not to allow a 
broker to access their accounts and, if so, under what terms and conditions. 
Accounting	  for	  Return	  Flows	  
When setting up any water accounting system, a choice needs to be made between the use of a “gross” 
or a “net” water accounting system.28 Both systems are equally robust but differ in administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Losses	  include	  flows	  from	  one	  zone	  to	  another,	  to	  a	  surface	  water	  resource,	  and	  to	  the	  sea.	  Losses	  can	  also	  occur	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  evapotranspiration	  when	  groundwater	  levels	  are	  close	  to	  a	  land	  surface.	  
28	  Sometimes	  “gross”	  and	  “net”	  accounting	  systems	  are	  described,	  respectively,	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  
water	  “withdrawn”	  from	  an	  aquifer	  and	  the	  amount	  that	  is	  “consumed.”	  The	  amount	  consumed	  is	  the	  amount	  that	  is	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costs. To a considerable extent, the choice comes down to the decision as to whether or not to meter 
water use or rely on satellite technology to estimate use. Provided surface water use is metered, recent 
advances in the analysis of satellite images make both approaches feasible. But as satellites cannot see 
into buildings and through glasshouses, some metering will always be necessary. 
When a gross accounting approach is adopted, a meter is typically used to estimate the volume of 
water extracted from a well and this amount deducted from the relevant water account without 
adjustment for return flows. Instead, every year, the basin authority estimates the average amount of 
water that is returned to the aquifer and, as average water use efficiency increases, reduces allocations 
per year. 
As a result, when a gross accounting system is used, each shareholder has an incentive to be among 
the first to increase water use efficiency. Those who do so gain a volumetric advantage until the 
others catch up. Whilst this approach is simple to administer, one of its downsides is that it can cause 
overinvestment in water-efficient technology at the regional level—especially when the mix of 
ground and surface water supplies is variable. When variability is high, a regional economy will be 
better off if some water users rely on opportunistic production systems that require little investment 
and, when supplies are short, can be shut down at little cost. 
When a net accounting approach is adopted, water users are charged only for the net amount of water 
they consume. To do this, it is necessary to estimate net use on each and every land parcel. In recent 
years, there have been considerable advances in remote sensing technology, and it is now possible to 
use this technology to estimate the net amount of water used on each land parcel. If surface water use 
is metered, then, conceptually, it is possible to rely on this technology to estimate the net amount of 
groundwater used on a parcel-by-parcel basis. 
Before consideration of administrative costs, arguably, net accounting systems are more equitable. It 
also needs to be recognized that in some groundwater systems there can be a considerable delay 
before returning water becomes once again available for use.29 The use of remote sensing technology 
also means that there is no need to install meters on each well, decide who should own them, and, if 
smart meters are not used, work out how frequently to read them, and so on. Careful assessment of all 
the options and of community preference is critical. 
Aquifer	  Recharge	  
In many parts of California there has been considerable investment in developing efficient ways to 
recharge an aquifer. In essence, there are two types of recharge projects: those designed to benefit all 
shareholders and those designed to benefit an individual water user. Either way, a permit needs to be 
issued and a means to estimate the amount of water being returned to the aquifer established. 
As recharge occurs, the volume of water returned is credited to the appropriate water account. From 
then on, it is up to the account holder to determine how the water is used. In the case of an irrigation 
district, for example, this water might be passed on to all the businesses that purchase water from the 
district. Where an individual decides to recharge an aquifer, all the benefit would pass directly to that 
individual. 
It is important for all augmentation projects to be treated in the same manner. If, for example, a basin 
authority commissioned a groundwater recharge project for the benefit of all shareholders, it would 
still have to establish a project water account. Once water was in that account, the authority could then 
decide to transfer the resultant allocations through to shareholders. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
withdrawn	  less	  that	  which	  returns	  via	  seepage	  back	  to	  the	  aquifer.	  When	  the	  irrigations	  system	  being	  used	  is	  very	  efficient,	  
gross	  and	  net	  use	  is	  similar.	  	  
29	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  better	  to	  be	  approximately	  right	  than	  comprehensively	  wrong.	  In	  many	  cases,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  be	  
approximately	  right	  than	  expensively	  precise.	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Recharging an aquifer as a means of groundwater banking is also encouraged by the roadmap. The 
banking entity might be a local irrigator or a large municipal water purveyor in need of additional 
reservoir capacity. Should the recharge project be approved, the entity would be issued a permit and 
given a water account for the specific project. 
Trading	  Allocations	  
When allocations are made, every shareholder has to decide whether or not to use them, sell them to 
someone else, or carry them forward for use in a subsequent year. 
As with a bank account, the roadmap envisages that users be given access to their own accounts and 
be able to check that use is being correctly debited and, if they wish, execute a transfer. 
Integral to a robust groundwater management system is the ability for individual users to manage their 
allocations, whether they decide to manage by using, saving, or transferring that allocation. When a 
plan first comes into full effect, all users will need to decide how much of their buffer allocation to 
keep and how much to use. They will also need to decide whether or not to adopt more efficient water 
using technologies or, for example, change the crops they grow. As shareholders and permit holders 
will have groundwater accounts created in their names, the costs of transferring allocations from one 
account to another should be minimal. As with bank accounts, the water accounts would be set up so 
that every account can be accessed and managed over the internet. 
When it comes to transfers, there are two options. One is for account holders to manage the transfers 
themselves. The other is to either transfer allocations to a broker or authorize a broker to access the 
account. While it may be tempting for a basin authority to offer to set up a brokering service, 
Australian experience suggests it may be wiser to leave water brokering to independent brokers. As a 
general rule, it is wiser for the keeper of the accounting system not to be involved in helping to 
negotiate prices.30 
Within-zone allocation trading can occur at a one-to-one exchange rate and, in continuous aquifers, 
can be both unfettered and instantaneous. In fractured aquifers and those with a slow connection, there 
can be need for a time delay while water moves from one location to another. When water is traded 
between zones, however, full account needs to be taken of the impacts that transfer of water from one 
zone to another can have on the interests of other water users. In particular, as well as setting 
exchange rates, the basin authority may need to change its allocation rules as trades occur. If one 
person trades 10 acre-feet from one zone to another, then the impact of the trade on water levels in the 
zone is probably trivial. If 50 people all decide to transfer 100 acre-feet to an adjoining zone, then 
local groundwater levels might temporarily rise,31 and a way needs to be be found to shepherd the 
water from one zone to another without compromising the allocation rules set out in a plan. If 
allowance was not made for this fact, those who remain could argue for an increased allocation. In 
light of this, the roadmap allows the basin authority to suspend interzone trading so that, for example, 
it can manage a sudden rush to transfer large amounts of water from zone to zone and adjust exchange 
rates so that the hydrological impacts and potential impacts of transferring large volumes of water 
from one aquifer to another can be managed. 
To retain investment confidence and a stable market, the roadmap proposes that the basin authority 
may neither reverse the transfer of an allocation from one zone to another nor retroactively modify an 
exchange rate. The roadmap envisages that the volume of interzone trades be tracked and that an 
automatic exchange rate review be triggered whenever the volume of trades exceeds a nominated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Even	  if	  a	  watermaster	  does	  not	  look	  into	  anyone’s	  account,	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  or	  she	  can	  do	  so	  means	  that	  sooner	  or	  later	  
someone	  will	  accuse	  that	  individual	  of	  attempting	  to	  manipulate	  a	  transaction	  using	  information	  not	  available	  to	  others.	  
31	  In	  this	  scenario,	  initially	  there	  may	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  groundwater	  level	  in	  the	  zone	  that	  is	  transferring	  water	  use	  
opportunities	  to	  another	  zone.	  As	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  water	  being	  used	  in	  the	  basin	  remains	  the	  same,	  the	  basin	  as	  a	  
whole	  remains	  in	  balance.	  The	  most	  appropriate	  groundwater	  level	  to	  maintain	  in	  each	  zone	  may	  change.	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amount. Annex 3 in the roadmap sets up rules for the transfer of allocations from one zone to 
another.32 
Interbasin	  Transfers	  
A related issue is the question of whether or not to allow the transfer of groundwater allocations out of 
a basin using a pipe or other conveyance system. As a general observation, the most common position 
taken by communities is that transferring across jurisdictional boundaries but within the same region 
is reasonably acceptable. Similarly, people living in a basin rarely object to piping water into “their” 
basin. Many people, however, oppose the piping of “their” water to a distant basin. It needs to be 
recognized, however, that if someone from a different basin is willing to pay more for access to water 
than its value to businesses and households in the local basin, then it may be better for the local 
district to accept the resultant payment and allow the money received to be reinvested in other, more 
profitable, ventures. 
There is, however, an additional consideration. Some people are of the view that the piping of water 
out of a basin should not be allowed to occur until the sustainability goal has been reached. As noted 
above, this may not be in the best interests of the community as it forgoes an economic opportunity. 
The roadmap takes the view that matters like the piping of water out of a district are more efficiently 
and effectively resolved by the local authorities responsible for approving the construction of the 
pipeline and not a basin authority. Basin authorities, however, would be responsible for negotiating 
the rules necessary to manage the subsurface conveyance of water from one basin to another. To this 
end, the roadmap provides both for interzone transfer agreements and the realignment of zone 
boundaries. The ultimate role of the authority is to ensure that any water extracted from a well is 
properly accounted for and, as it is so taken, deducted from the appropriate water account. Other than 
ensuring that use does not harm an aquifer, it is not the authority’s role to determine how and where 
this water is used. 
Enforcement	  
In practice, the water-accounting and groundwater-use-permitting systems are among the most critical 
parts of any water sharing system. If the systems put in place are not rigorous and have no integrity, 
the entire regulatory system must be expected to fail. 
Every water user must be made to understand that the uncorrected overuse of a water account is as 
serious as stealing from one’s neighbor. To this end, the roadmap makes a clear distinction between 
unintentional and intentional overuse. 
Unintentional overuse can occur by accident. Whenever this happens, every water user is given an 
opportunity to return the account to a nonnegative balance within 30 days. To encourage 
communication, as soon as an account goes into negative balance, the owner of that account would 
immediately receive an advisory warning. The account holder would then have 30 days to either 
organize for the transfer of unused water allocations from another account or opt to have his or her 
groundwater permit suspended until the commencement of the following year and have an amount 
equal to the deficit debited from the water account. 
The cost of opting to borrow from next year is likely to be double the cost of purchasing unused water 
allocations from someone else. This arrangement is designed to provide a strong incentive for water 
users to keep their water accounts in a nonnegative balance. As peer pressure plays an important role 
in securing compliance, the watermaster would in such circumstances be required to notify all other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  As	  allocations	  cannot	  have	  any	  third-­‐party	  interest	  recorded	  against	  them,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  a	  basin	  authority	  to	  
prevent	  any	  trade	  executed	  by	  the	  account	  holder.	  As	  with	  bank	  accounts,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  procedures	  to	  both	  make	  it	  
difficult	  for	  anyone	  to	  break	  into	  an	  account	  and,	  if	  this	  occurs,	  take	  appropriate	  action.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  groundwater,	  the	  
risks	  of	  this	  are	  much	  less	  as	  trades	  can	  only	  be	  conducted	  among	  known	  account	  holders.	  The	  beneficiary	  of	  a	  fraudulent	  
transfer	  can	  easily	  be	  identified.	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shareholders that the user’s account is in serious deficit. If an account holder fails to make good or 
fails to elect to borrow from next year’s water account, the roadmap assumes that the holder is 
seeking intentionally to challenge the integrity of the sharing system and should be treated 
accordingly. Intentional overusers, it is suggested, should  
•   Have their groundwater use permits suspended immediately 
•   Have an amount equal to double the overuse debited from their water account 
•   Consistent with SGMA, be liable for a fine of up to $500 per acre-foot 
•   Consistent with SGMA, be liable for a fine of $1,000 plus $100 per day that the violation 
occurs after 30 days of the initial notification.33 
Regular or ongoing attempts to overdraw an account or any attempt to run an account seriously into 
deficit would be defined as intentional overuse and, in addition to the above penalties, could result in 
the cancelation of a groundwater use permit. 
In addition, it is suggested that all other shareholders and permit holders in the zone be notified that 
the overuser’s water account has been suspended and is at risk of cancelation. If overuse continues, 
the watermaster should be required to cancel the permit. 
Domestic	  Uses	  
The arrangements set out in the roadmap give preferential treatment to domestic groundwater users 
who source their water from their own private wells. The reasons for this preferential treatment are 
twofold. First, access to the water necessary for household and domestic purposes is considered by the 
state of California to be a fundamental human right.34 Second, the costs of metering groundwater use 
on domestic wells in many locations is likely to be greater than its benefits and could run into 
politically difficult enforcement challenges. 
Sometimes it is better to be approximately right rather than expensively correct. In practice, it is likely 
to be more cost effective to require counties and cities to offset the impact of estimated domestic 
groundwater well use on an aquifer than to issue shares to and meter each domestic well. 
The roadmap suggests that domestic households be allowed to extract up to two acre-feet of water per 
annum. Then, to ensure that domestic groundwater use does not adversely affect the interests of each 
shareholder, the watermaster is required to establish a groundwater account for each region where 
domestic groundwater use is occurring to offset for that use and require the relevant county or city to 
keep that account in nonnegative balance. Among other things, this gives these agencies a strong 
incentive to encourage households to connect to a main water supply. 
In practice, one would expect these agencies to make land subdivision approvals subject to the supply 
of sufficient shares to enable the offset of the approval on a city’s or county’s financial budget. 
In recognition of the importance of continuing to provide domestic access to water during periods of 
extreme stress, the roadmap also provides that when zero allocations per shareholder are being made, 
domestic groundwater users will be restricted to 0.5 acre-feet per household. This arrangement also 
extends to any household that draws its water from a well primarily used for irrigation purposes, 
permitting it a minimum allocation of 0.5 acre-feet. 
Finally, as a city or county would only have to account for actual use, every time it succeeds in 
convincing a household to source its water from a municipal water purveyor it would be able to 
transfer the shares necessary to do this to the relevant purveyor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  See	  SGMA	  §10732(a).	  
34	  See	  http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120AB685.	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Other	  De	  Minimis	  Uses	  
In most California groundwater districts the nondomestic forms of de minimis water use are few. Of 
these, one of the most common uses is the pumping of water for livestock using a windmill or a solar 
pump. The roadmap suggests that, subject to a volumetric restriction of one acre-foot per annum, 
nondomestic de minimis use be allowed to continue and be ignored until a basin authority considers 
that the cost of accounting for them is less than the benefit to all others of doing so. Where they are 
significant, the most cost-effective solution probably involves a means to collectively assess the 
effects of this form of water use at the farm or district level and charge all a flat fee for the cost of 
offsetting their collective impact on an aquifer. 
Shares	  
The last part of the trio of suggested permit, allocation, and sharing arrangements is the role that 
shares play in deciding how opportunities to access groundwater are distributed. Any share allocation 
process normally begins with the “closure” of access to the aquifer in question. In the roadmap, this is 
achieved by determining that once shares have been issued, the only way anyone can increase the 
number of shares they hold is to find someone prepared to transfer shares to them.35 
Following the model used by corporations, each share is numbered and is not divisible. To enable the 
efficient management of these shares, the roadmap suggests that either one or 10 shares be issued per 
acre-inch of current use.36 Once the initial share allocation has been made, further shares may be 
issued only if a way can be found to jurisdictionally increase the size of the aquifer when, for 
example, its boundary is changed. 
When boundaries are realigned, an appropriate number of shares are moved from one zone to another 
without change to any other shares. Administratively, this is much cheaper than defining each share as 
a proportional entitlement. When expressed as a proportional entitlement, every time a boundary is 
altered every share has to be canceled and reissued. 
Share	  Transfers	  
From a share-trading perspective, the larger the area of each zone, the greater the number of shares 
and, hence, the greater the opportunities to trade shares. The roadmap suggests that, while the trade of 
shares between zones should not be allowed, it will be possible for any shareholder to organize what 
is known as a “tagged” trade. 
A tagged trade involves the purchase of shares in one zone with the intent of always extracting the 
water allocated to these shares in another zone. When this is done, the purchaser requests that a 
permanent entry be made in the water accounting system that requires all allocations made to them in 
one zone to be transferred, as soon as they are allocated, to a water account in the other zone at 
whatever the exchange rate is. In practice, tagged trading is less risky for the basin as a whole than the 
permanent interzone trading of shares as the practice assigns all the long-term exchange-rate risk to 
the purchaser. No long-term risk is borne by third parties. Permission to enter into a tagged trade 
should be made in a manner that is binding on the basin authority. Once approved, the only way the 
basin authority could stop it from continuing in perpetuity would be to set the between-zone exchange 
rate to zero. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  There	  are	  exceptions.	  Additional	  shares	  can	  be	  issued	  when	  the	  area	  of	  a	  basin	  is	  increased.	  When	  the	  total	  volume	  of	  
available	  groundwater	  available	  is	  increased	  a	  new	  share	  issue	  could	  be	  made.	  In	  Australia’s	  Great	  Artesian	  Basin,	  for	  
example,	  the	  government	  decided	  to	  cap	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  artesian	  wells.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  was	  a	  considerable	  
reduction	  in	  water	  losses,	  and	  the	  government	  decided	  to	  offset	  some	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  capping	  the	  wells	  by	  auctioning	  off	  
some	  additional	  water	  rights.	  
36	  The	  issuing	  of	  unit	  shares,	  rather	  than	  shares	  defined	  as	  a	  proportion,	  makes	  it	  much	  cheaper	  to	  realign	  zone	  boundaries.	  
Once	  the	  total	  number	  of	  shares	  has	  been	  determined,	  each	  share	  effectively	  entitles	  its	  holder	  to	  a	  proportion	  of	  all	  
allocations	  made;	  whenever	  there	  is	  a	  boundary	  change	  every	  share	  has	  to	  be	  reissued.	  If	  shares	  are	  defined	  as	  a	  unit	  then	  
when	  shares	  are	  moved	  from	  one	  zone	  to	  another,	  for	  example,	  only	  those	  shares	  involved	  in	  the	  adjustment	  process	  need	  
to	  be	  canceled	  in	  one	  zone	  and	  reissued	  in	  the	  other.	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Share	  Registers	  
Finally, as one of the objectives of the proposed sharing regime is to decrease risk, the roadmap 
proposes that the share register be structured in a manner similar to a Torrens title land registration 
system.37 Rare in the United States, these registers are established by a government and make it clear 
that the only way a person can own a share is to have their name recorded in the register. There is no 
argument. If your name is not there, you are not the owner. In practice, this means that any person 
wishing to purchase a share can do so only by contracting to change the share register. Costs are low, 
and no title insurance is necessary. 
When shares are traded from one interest to another, the application must indicate the nature of the 
required change in the water account to which the share is linked. 
Mortgages	  
As an incentive to increase investment, the roadmap also suggests that it be possible to register an 
interest in one or more shares and then require that transfers occur only in a manner that has been 
approved by the registered interest. A number of water and fishery share systems in Australia and 
New Zealand allow for the low-cost registration of interests in shares, and this has proved to be 
effective in catalyzing investment and innovation in these sharing systems. The most common type of 
financial interest is a mortgage secured against the value of a share portfolio. Banks tend to like this 
form of security, as a mortgage over a share is much easier and quicker to liquidate than a mortgage 
over a land parcel. 
Changes	  in	  Land	  and	  Share	  Values	  
Note that during the process of setting up a water sharing system there can be a significant shift in the 
value of irrigated land. Under the traditional system, a farm may be worth US$1 million. In a sharing 
system, that value might be divided with the shares worth perhaps US$200,000 and the land parcel 
US$800,000. 
Global experience would, however, suggest that separation of land ownership arrangements from 
water rights could result in a significant increase in the value of a water right. As a result, during the 
transition to a groundwater sharing system, careful communication with the banking sector and those 
responsible for local rating systems is necessary. During the transition, the roadmap proposes that any 
interests recorded against a land parcel be transferred to the shares issued to each parcel owner so that 
there is minimum disruption to existing financial arrangements. 
During the transition process, local cities and counties may need to review the implications of a 
decision to issue shares that might cause a reduction in land values. 
Issuing	  Shares	  
Arguably, when introducing a groundwater sharing system, the most difficult issue to resolve is the 
question of who to issue shares to and how many shares to issue to each person. In essence, the 
challenge is to find the fairest way to cut the “cake” in a manner that recognizes existing laws, notions 
of equity and fairness, and the value of current production systems. When it comes to equity 
considerations, there is a need for fairness in process and fairness in outcome. 
With regard to fairness in process, it is important that all people are given the opportunity to 
contribute and that their views are heard and seen to be heard. With regard to outcome, it is important 
to consider immediate and longer-term outcomes. Also, it is important to understand that what seems 
like a minor variation in an allocation formula may transfer many thousands of dollars from one group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  See	  M.D.	  Young	  and	  J.C.	  McColl,	  “Robust	  Separation:	  A	  Search	  for	  a	  Generic	  Framework	  to	  Simplify	  Registration	  and	  
Trading	  of	  Interests	  in	  Natural	  Resources,”	  report	  for	  CSIRO	  Land	  and	  Water	  (2002),	  
http://www.myoung.net.au/water/publications/Robust_Separation.pdf.	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of individuals to another. No matter how well-designed the process is, it must be expected that 
influential stakeholders may try to manipulate the process to gain advantage. As experience with the 
issuing of shares in U.S. fisheries has shown, for example, this means there is a need for careful 
attention to consultation and negotiation processes.38 
The available experience tends to make two points. First, any share allocation process needs to be 
implemented in stages. Steps that can be handled with administrative efficiency should be separated 
from those steps that, without careful attention to process, can be expected to cause controversy. 
Noncontroversial steps include, for example, informing people that shares will be issued only to the 
people whose names are listed on the county’s land parcel register. The message is simple: “Any 
person who thinks that the register is incorrect should act immediately to correct it.” 
Second, most sharing systems start with a significant degree of “grandfathering.” That is, the initial 
allocation needs to be closely correlated with existing patterns of water. Attempts to start with a 
radical reallocation of opportunities usually fail. During the early stages of introduction, avoid 
allocating shares in a manner that imposes costs on existing groundwater users. In particular, avoid 
forcing existing users to suddenly have to buy water allocations from people who in the past have 
never used water. 
Steps	  
In an attempt to separate the controversial from the noncontroversial, the roadmap suggests a six-step 
process: 
(1)   Determine eligibility. Determining who is eligible to be included in the share allocation 
process. 
(2)   Design the allocation database. Determining the full range of data to be collected and 
considered during the share allocation process. 
(3)   Assemble and validate the database. Collecting the necessary data and validating its 
content. 
(4)   Develop and finalize the formula. With due process and engagement, determining the most 
appropriate formula or formulas to be used to determine how many shares each eligible entity 
should receive in a manner that is seen to be fair and then choosing the most appropriate 
formula to use. 
(5)   Build the share register. Combining the data in the database with the selected allocation 
formula to build the register and then inviting all who think they should have received shares 
to check the accuracy of this register and, if they find any error or omission, request that it be 
corrected. 
(6)   Confirm the accuracy of the share register. A final step that makes it impossible for any 
further changes to be made to the register because of an error or an omission. 
Once a decision on eligibility is taken, all but the fourth step—selection of the allocation formula—
are processes that need to be run and, in competent hands, should not prove controversial. 
With regard to eligibility to receive shares, the roadmap suggests that eligibility should be restricted to 
those entities whose names are recorded in a land parcel register. Only the land parcel owner—
whether an individual landowner, the municipal water purveyor, or the federal government—would 
be issued shares. That is, no tenant or lessee would be entitled to receive shares. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  There	  is	  considerable	  experience	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  shares	  in	  fisheries—including	  a	  number	  of	  U.S.	  fisheries.	  An	  
excellent	  summary	  of	  this	  experience	  by	  Wendy	  E.	  Morrison	  and	  Tara	  L.	  Scott	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa./management/allocation/morrison_scott_allocation_report.pdf.	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The roadmap also suggests that shares sufficient to offset the impacts of domestic water use be issued 
to the cities and counties that, under the plan, are required to offset the impacts of this form of their 
groundwater use on other shareholders. 
Sharing	  Formulas	  
With regard to the formula to be chosen, the roadmap puts forward a suggested default option for the 
allocation of shares that has been developed in consultation with a significant number of stakeholders. 
From the perspective of land suitable for irrigation, there are two differing perspectives. The first is 
that allocations should be made on the basis of recent use adjusted for capacity to improve efficiency 
so that the sharing-system rollout does not adversely impact existing water users. The second is that 
allocations should be made in proportion to land area as this is what many consider the current right to 
be. Pragmatically speaking, think of the first perspective as an existing use perspective and the second 
perspective as an area perspective. 
Default	  Sharing	  Formula	  
To assist all to understand at least one of the options and the processes that need to be followed, the 
roadmap contains a default formula for consideration by forming GSAs. The default suggests that, 
initially, the formula be skewed in favor of existing uses but be rolled out in a manner that is coupled 
to a process that progressively reallocates shares in proportion to land area. That is, at the start, all 
existing users are grandfathered in to the system in a manner that causes minimum disruption. A 
percentage of each shareholding is then reallocated in proportion to land area so that ultimately a 
proportion of all the shares are issued in proportion to land area. Under this arrangement, any land 
parcel owner who has yet to begin using groundwater is given an increasing opportunity to do so. 
With regard to the detail necessary to determine the best way to estimate existing use, fishery share 
and Australian water reform experience suggest it is possible to rely on best practice water use 
recommendations made by an independent authority, on historical use data, preferably adjusted for the 
efficiency of water-using technology, or both. 
In the case of the latter approach, if one irrigator is growing oranges using overhead sprinklers and 
another irrigator is using a much more efficient drip irrigation system, then it can be argued that the 
drip irrigator is entitled to more shares for having already upgraded to the use of state-of-the-art 
technology. This irrigator has less room to move and, arguably, has already made a contribution to the 
resolution of the basin’s problems. 
The roadmap’s suggestion is that shares be allocated in proportion to the estimated maximum annual 
amount that would have been used in the last five years using best management practices. There are, 
however, many variants of this arrangement. Other equally valid approaches take the mean of the last 
five or so years or allow the year of lowest consumption to be dropped from the data used to 
determine share entitlements. 
An issue of greater importance is the question of who decides on the formula to be used and what 
processes should be used in the lead-up to the final decision. Pragmatically, the process chosen needs 
to be seen as equitable and brought to closure as quickly as possible. Once all the information is in 
and the consequences understood, a decision needs to be made. Procrastination is unlikely to lead to a 
better outcome and more likely to create a sense of distrust. 
In the interest of getting an efficient and politically acceptable decision, fishery sharing experience 
suggests that if a basin authority comes to the view that the formula choice might compromise its 
capacity to retain community support, it should use an independent panel to run the processes 
necessary to select the most appropriate share allocation formula. As drafted, the roadmap allows the 
basin authority to leave determination of the most appropriate share allocation formula to use to an 
independent panel. 
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A	  Warning	  
When it comes to community discussions about the question of which version of a formula to support, 
it is surprisingly hard for each water user to work out which version of the formula is best for them. 
Unless one lies at the extreme of the distribution, it is necessary to know the size and status of every 
entity under consideration. 
When many water users are involved in a share allocation process, and they all have different histories 
of water use, typically one needs a computer to sort through the options and assess distributional 
effects. It is easy for a groundwater user to argue vigorously for one version of the many formulas 
under consideration and, at a later date, discover that it would have been better to argue for a different 
version. 
Community,	  Environmental,	  and	  Other	  Special	  Projects	  
In addition to all the above features, the roadmap opens up an opportunity for a city, county, or other 
entity to organize to sponsor a community project. A city might, for example, decide to undertake to 
supply and be accountable for all the water used to maintain a football field or a privately owned park. 
For completeness and as it may make implementation of the entire plan administratively easier, the 
roadmap opens up the opportunity for cities and counties to engage in such projects. 
Funding	  
The last issue raised in the roadmap is the question of funding. One would expect the watermaster and 
all authority members to be paid and have all operating and accommodation costs and other expenses 
reimbursed. To this end, the roadmap suggests that costs be recovered via an array of charges 
including charges per share, per unit of water extracted, or for every water account held. In addition, it 
is suggested that the basin authority charge on a cost-of-service basis. 
Given the pioneering nature of the work entailed in setting up a sharing system, there may be a strong 
case for financial assistance from the government.39 If there is broad interest in the pursuit of sharing 
systems consistent with the roadmap, then it would be preferable for the state government to fund and 
coordinate development of the necessary share registers, water accounting, and use monitoring 
systems. Primary responsibility for the ongoing funding of a GSA and any basin authority established 
and so on depends on the nature of the agreement among the parties that establish the GSA. SGMA 
authorizes a GSA to levy a broad range of fees to accomplish this.40 
Conclusions	  
The above description of the roadmap has been written for the purpose of providing an overview of 
the design of robust water sharing arrangements. The overall structure of the suggested framework 
focuses on development of local knowledge and quick response capacity by all, including the state 
government. Unbundling and the separate management of shares (investment), volumetric allocations 
(production), and environmental impacts (use approvals) make it possible to manage issues at scale. 
For the first time, communities will be able to resolve the issues associated with each asset without 
disrupting other features that are essential to community functioning and vitality. 
The shares system would allow for a robust drought management regime to be put in place. If 
implemented along the lines suggested, for the first time ever, all California groundwater users are 
granted the opportunity to carry unused water forward from year to year. Low-cost allocation trading 
becomes possible. 
A mortgageable asset is also created. Share registers are guaranteed and can be expected to catalyze 
significant investment and innovation. A pragmatic, long-term adjustment strategy is put in place. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  See	  http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/grants_loans/gw_funding/	  and	  
http://www.water.ca.gov/irwm/grants/sgwp/.	  
40	  See	  SGMA,	  Chapter	  8	  “Financial	  Authority.”	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TWO	  ILLUSTRATIVE	  CASE	  STUDIES	  
During development of the roadmap, we worked closely with people involved in the development of 
groundwater sustainability agencies in the San Luis Obispo Valley Basin, Tule Subbasin, and Kern 
County Subbasin. Initially, we had planned to use real data and present modeled scenarios of what a 
transition to a water sharing system would mean for these communities. As we progressed this work 
and spent time with them, however, it became clear that if we did this we would violate our own 
guidelines for the development of local plans.  
Instead, we offer two hypothetical cases studies—one for the California coast and one for the Central 
Valley. Each case study reveals how different elements of the suggested sharing system can be used 
by potential GSAs to resolve the challenges faced by each type of groundwater-using community. 
Coastal	  Basin	  Hypothetical	  
Overview	  
Attributes common to coastal basins in California include 
•   A coastal aquifer buffering against or succumbing to saline water intrusion from the sea; 
•   Mixed land uses, including dense areas of urbanization, commercial development, and 
agricultural plots benefiting from the coastal climate; 
•   Surface water systems of minimal annual or ephemeral flows; 
•   Significant surface water imports to meet urban and industrial needs; and 
•   Heavy reliance on groundwater and coastal showers to meet agricultural needs. 
Figure 4 presents a mock-up of a hypothetical coastal basin with a relatively simple hydrology. All 
groundwater flows toward the center of the basin and then, if not pumped, from the center to the sea 
via a coastal subbasin.  
Adjacent to the sea, some high-value irrigated vineyards remain in close proximity to a growing city 
renowned for its beach and restaurants. Inland, there is another much larger city with a thriving 
community reputed for its strong connection with the wine industry. A few small towns are located 
throughout the basin.  
Most of the basin’s land is used for dryland agricultural purposes and rural living. Nearly all of the 
“good” irrigation land has been irrigated for many years. Given current prices and current technology, 
there is little further land suitable for irrigated agriculture. This is why it remains in dryland 
agriculture. It is common for people to live on a rural block of between one and five acres in size. 
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Figure	  4.	  Simplified	  mockup	  of	  a	  typical	  West	  Coast	  groundwater	  basin	  
	  
In this hypothetical coastal basin, there are three subbasins—namely, a northern subbasin, a southern 
subbasin, and a coastal subbasin—and a small ephemeral river that flows through the center of the 
basin and intermittently reaches the sea. To achieve its long-term sustainability goal, groundwater use 
has to be reduced by 30% from around 300,000 acre-feet to around 200,000 acre-feet. Saline water 
intrusion is threatening the viability of the vineyards near the sea. With the exception of land within 
the two cities, all land zoning is under the jurisdiction of the local county’s board of supervisors.  
There is an inland city and a coastal city. The inland city has a municipal water purveyor that sources 
60% of its water from several wells close to the city and 40% from a dam located in the nearby hills. 
(During long dry periods, more is taken from the groundwater source.) It treats sewage and returns it 
to the aquifer via the river (very little reaches the sea). The near-urban area contains 60 households 
that rely on “their” domestic wells. 
The coastal city sources all of its water supply from a nearby dam and is surrounded by 40 households 
that rely on a domestic well. Inside the city and one mile from the sea a contaminated plume of water 
has been found drifting slowly toward the sea. 
Beyond the boundaries of each city, there are 470 “domestic” land parcels. Typically, each 
“domestic” land parcel is between one and five acres in area. 
Using its data and the above knowledge, the Department of Water Resources identified the basin as a 
medium-priority basin that is not in a critical state in 2016. The target date for attaining the long-term 
sustainability goal is 2042. 
	  33	  
Governance	  
After careful assessment of the options and several community meetings, a group of seven local 
organizations including the county, the two cities, and several farm organizations agreed to establish a 
working group to work out how to form a groundwater sustainability agency (GSA). The county 
agreed to support this working group, recognizing that ultimately the county itself would at least be 
partially responsible for the basin’s administration. Luck was on everyone’s side. Members of the 
working group got on well and enjoyed meeting on a regular basis. 
After several meetings, it was decided that the county and the inland city should enter into a joint 
powers agreement, bring their common powers to the GSA, and enter into a memorandum of 
understanding with the five other organizations involved. The coastal city, which was not involved in 
groundwater use, decided not to be involved in the joint powers agreement. Following the passage of 
these agreements, the GSA was officially formed and notice posted to the Department of Water 
Resources. 
After 90 days and no opposition from other GSA-eligible agencies, the GSA became the exclusive 
GSA for the basin. The GSA also gained an in-principle support from the Department of Water 
Resources for them to appoint a basin authority and prepare an administrative plan consistent with this 
report’s roadmap. Encouraged by enthusiastic county supervisors and the inland city mayor, it was 
decided to go for the first-mover advantage that would be obtained by moving ahead of the 126 other 
California groundwater basins involved in the SGMA process. 
Each organization was allowed to appoint two persons to the GSA on the understanding that their 
main responsibilities would be to appoint a chair and four other people to a basin authority and then 
monitor its development. 
An appropriate chair and four other members with appropriate skills were soon found. The chair was a 
well-recognized communicator and respected leader. Everyone was pleased that this person accepted 
the position. After considerable discussion, it was decided to appoint a wine grower from a 
neighboring basin to the authority. Other members included a water lawyer with policy experience, a 
consulting hydrologist, and a local economist. By May 2017, a watermaster who had worked in local 
government had been appointed, and the task of developing and implementing the plan began. 
As soon as the chair of the basin authority was appointed, she met with the working group, thanked 
them for their hard work, and invited them, on behalf of the authority, to form the basis of the 
authority’s stakeholder reference panel. In retrospect, it became obvious that this decision saved the 
basin authority a lot of time and angst as the members of the working group held much of the 
information to which they needed access. 
Funding	  
During the search for authority members and the watermaster, a proposal was submitted to the 
Department of Water Resources and the California State Water Board to secure the funds necessary to 
cover 50% of the cost of setting up and running the basin authority for its first two years. The 
proposal was approved and funds were disbursed from the Proposition 1A Department of Water 
Resources Sustainable Groundwater Planning Grant Program. The other 50% of funding came from 
the county in the form of office space and administrative support. All staff, it was proposed, would be 
employed through the county. The county also agreed to provide financial management services. 
Monitoring	  and	  Accounting	  for	  Groundwater	  Use	  
Collectively, the basin authority, in consultation with their stakeholder reference panel, identified two 
early challenges. First, they had to decide whether or not to monitor extractions using meters or rely 
on the new remote satellite sensing techniques that had yet to be proven. As the basin is often covered 
by fog, it was decided to go with the use of smart meters. They also decided to adopt a gross 
accounting system in the hope that this would keep administrative costs low. Arguing that it would be 
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better if everyone had the same meter, it was decided also that all meters would be owned by the basin 
authority and the cost of installing and reading them be recovered through an annual charge on 
groundwater use permit holders. As a result of this decision, a number of land parcel owners 
immediately decided to decommission wells they were no longer using. At the same time, a letter was 
sent to all land parcel owners informing them whether or not the county records indicated that a well 
permit applied to their land. 
Issuing	  Shares	  
The second issue related to the collection of the data needed to determine eligibility to receive shares 
and allocate them. Work on assembling the database needed to enable the issuing of shares, however, 
was delayed until the basin authority had finalized the rest of the plan. This, the basin authority 
concluded, was important as meters could not be installed on wells until the plan had been approved 
by the Department of Water Resources.41 
Work on the steps involved in allocating shares started late in 2017. The first step in this process 
involved developing a way to align well completion reports and permits with land parcels. This 
proved to be a nontrivial exercise, as it was common for the water from a well to be used on several 
land parcels. A consultant was appointed to develop an efficient solution to this challenge and 
assemble the necessary data. 
Coastal	  Zone	  Shares	  
With regard to the coastal subbasin, the coastal city had not and was not aspiring to take any 
groundwater as it was too salty. The coastal city did, however, decide to account for the effects of the 
40 known domestic wells in its subbasin. The rest was relatively simple; the only other groundwater 
users were 12 vineyards and seven wineries located on each property. Pragmatically, it was decided 
that each vineyard would be allocated 0.8 acre-feet per irrigated acre. To make the conversion process 
as simple as possible, it was decided that share entitlements would be described in the same number 
of units as acre-feet on the understanding, of course, that shares simply represented a proportional unit 
of interest in the basin’s water resource. Table 2 shows assessed share entitlements. 
Table	  1.	  Assessed	  share	  entitlements	  
Entitlement	  Recipient	   Share	  Entitlements	  
Coastal	  city	  for	  domestic	  well	  offsetting	  of	  42	  wells	  by	  an	  estimated	  1.2	  acre-­‐feet	  
per	  well	  	  
50.4	  
Vineyard	  land	  parcel	  owners,	  700	  irrigated	  acres	  at	  0.8	  acre-­‐feet	  per	  acre	  	   560	  
Wineries	  that	  in	  the	  most	  productive	  year	  over	  the	  last	  five	  years	  had	  produced	  
15,000	  cases	  at	  an	  estimated	  0.5	  acre-­‐feet	  per	  100	  cases	  	  
75	  
Total	  	   1,144.6	  
 
The basin authority decided that shares would be issued at a rate of 10 shares per acre-inch of share 
entitlement, which resulted in a proposal to issue 1,144.6 × 12 × 10 = 137,352 shares. 
As this announcement was made, two domestic well users who owned five acres of land each realized 
that the city might pressure them to either shift to the city’s municipal supply or limit their total water 
use to two acre-feet per annum. Wanting to use more than this amount, they requested and were 
granted the opportunity to be issued shares in the same way as vineyard operators were to receive 
shares. One of them received 2.2 share entitlements and the other 3.2 share entitlements. (Two years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  The	  right	  to	  enter	  a	  land	  parcel	  and	  install	  a	  meter	  was	  attached	  to	  the	  Groundwater	  Use	  Permit	  and	  these	  could	  not	  be	  
issued	  before	  the	  Plan	  was	  approved.	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later both wondered whether or not they had made a mistake. They had forgotten to take account of 
the cost of having to hold a standard groundwater use permit and metering their use.) 
Inland	  City	  Zone	  
Share allocation in the inland city zone was straightforward. Maximum groundwater use by the city’s 
municipal water supplier in the last five years was 28,800 acre-feet, so the city accepted the offer of 
28,800 × 12 = 345,000 shares. To this, the city was assigned a further 1,008 shares in light of its 
obligation to offset the effects of 60 domestic wells at an estimated 1.4 acre-feet per well. The higher 
rate of conversion for inland city wells compared with coastal domestic wells that the inland climate 
is drier and warmer. 
Early on in the plan’s development, the city fought hard to have the area it drew water from as a 
separated zone. This arrangement was included in the plan, but as they proceeded it became clear that 
this meant they alone would need to live within the limits of “their” zone. 
Northern	  and	  Southern	  Zones	  
Having found the preparation of an “interim” plan relatively easy and the issuing of shares in the 
coastal zone noncontroversial, the basin authority began to address share allocation in the north and 
the south. They had hoped to proceed along the same lines, issuing shares to irrigating farmers using a 
standard allocation per irrigated acre and issuing sufficient shares to the county to enable them to 
offset the effects of domestic wells located outside the inland city. 
As they had done in the coastal zone, it was decided to estimate water use on irrigated land using a set 
of independent estimates of water use available from a local university. For the purpose of deciding 
each person’s conversion entitlement, it was decided to use the following recommendations: 
•   Irrigated alfalfa  2.9 acre-feet per acre 
•   Citrus  1.5 acre-feet per acre 
•   Deciduous fruit trees  2.1 acre-feet per acre 
•   Vegetable production with three crops per year  1.6 acre-feet per acre 
•   Grapes  0.8 acre-feet per acre 
Two unanticipated issues quickly arose. First, a number of irrigated land parcel owners had recently 
changed land use. Some had swapped from more to less water-intensive crops and others from less to 
more water-intensive crops. Second, there were large areas of nonirrigated land that parcel owners felt 
had irrigation potential. These landowners were arguing that they should be granted their “fair” share. 
With regard to the first issue, there were several cases where land that had been used to grow irrigated 
alfalfa at a rate of 2.8 acre-feet per acre had been converted into vegetable production that only used 
1.6 acre-feet per acre. The affected land parcel owners in both cases were furious as they were leasing 
their land to tenants and had swapped tenants because they could get more rent from a vegetable 
farmer than from an alfalfa grower. If they had known that this decision would reduce the number of 
shares they received, they said, they would never have agreed to do this. Eventually, it was decided 
that shares would be issued in proportion to assessed water use on current (not past) land use. 
The other question, that of whether or not to issue shares to nonirrigating landowners, proved to be a 
difficult discussion. Early on, it was recognized that if there was to be no increase in total 
groundwater use, then every share issued to a nongroundwater user would disrupt an existing 
business. Community discussions identified support for the initial proposition that share allocations, at 
least in the short term, should not disrupt current use. Many nonusers, however, were arguing that 
they should be entitled to some shares. As a result, they began to lobby for the annual reallocation of 
1% of all shares to landowners in proportion to area. 
The issue was resolved when the community came to the view that nearly all the land suitable for 
irrigation was already being irrigated and that it would be unreasonable to assign shares to these land 
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parcel owners as they would never be able to use this water on “their” land. Their right, if it existed at 
all, was a paper right and not one that could ever be exercised. There were, however, a few land parcel 
owners who did have some land that could be developed for irrigation. 
Discussions about how many shares should be issued to nondomestic non-irrigated land had another 
effect. As people explored this issue, it was suggested that a percentage of each shareholding could be 
taken from each shareholder and that these shares, instead of being reallocated in proportion to land 
area, could be auctioned. If this was done, a vibrant share market would be established, and the 
resultant revenue could be used to offset the fixed cost of running the basin authority. What could be 
fairer, it was said, than requiring everyone to contribute 1% of the value of their shares to the costs of 
running the basin authority? The idea nearly got off the ground but was killed off by the inland city, 
which wanted to maintain monopoly control of “its” zone. It was fearful that someone might outbid it 
at the auction and that it would lose its monopoly status. Ultimately, it was decided to fund the basin 
authority using charges similar to those set out in Annex 4 to the roadmap. 
Outcomes	  
In retrospect, the decision to go for first-mover advantage worked. The basin secured a major role in 
advising other groundwater basins on ways to set up sharing systems. Several consulting businesses 
were established, and the region became a recognized world leader in groundwater management. 
An unexpected spin-off was a rapid shift in groundwater use along the coast. Several of the vineyards 
there had been noticing that their yields and the quality of their fruit was in decline. Salinity levels 
were getting too high to grow grapes. The opportunity to set up tagged trades was discussed with 
them, and several grape growers decided to put such a deal together. Each was successful in locking 
in a commitment to allow them to always trade their water allocations inland. With these approvals 
locked away, they were able to move much of their production inland and allow the most saline parts 
of their land to be converted into resorts whose water would be supplied by the local municipality. 
This shift halved local groundwater demand and solved the coastal city’s seawater intrusion problem. 
Transition to the sharing system also made it easier to manage the plume near the coast. In 2025, 
when this plume was discovered, all groundwater pumping near it had to be stopped. The basin 
authority used its powers to do this but kept making allocations to all shareholders in the zone. Those 
adversely affected by the plume discovery found that selling some of their allocations to others in the 
basin could offset the financial impact, significantly reducing the cost of managing the plume. 
During the transition, its impact on a water sharing system had two other implications. Local banks 
noticed that share values tended to rise, and they started to lend money using the value of these shares 
as security. Bank support for a transition to a sharing system quickly moved statewide. Banks had 
discovered that shares were easy to value and, if a borrower got into financial difficulty, much easier 
than land to liquidate. Many irrigators sold shares to finance improvements in water use efficiency. 
The rising value of shares relative to irrigated land, however, did challenge the county commissioners, 
who feared that the transition to shares might erode their capacity to tax land values. For a while they 
considered introducing a mechanism that would enable them to define basin water shares as a form of 
property that could be taxed. As a result of the growth and regional development that occurred, 
however, they decided not to try to tax basin shares. 
Population growth in the inland city raised another issue. As the inland city expanded, the city’s 
municipal water purveyor started to source water from outside “its” zone. Accustomed to being a 
monopoly shareholder in the city’s zone, it approached the basin authority with a view to revising the 
boundary. The result of starting these discussions was the reverse of what the purveyor had expected. 
The basin authority, now confident of its capacity to manage the basin, offered a counterproposal. It 
said that the city’s monopoly control of a sub-subbasin was inappropriate. It was time to roll the city’s 
zone back into the southern zone. In 2028, all the inland city’s shares were converted into southern 
zone shares. 
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On several occasions, public discussions focused on the fate of the stream that flowed through the 
inland city. These issues were never resolved and credit never sought for the contribution that the 
inland city’s treated effluent made to the basin, but there was discussion about the case for setting a 
policy threshold that would require the average maximum depth to groundwater to rise over time. 
Central	  Valley	  Basin	  Hypothetical	  
Overview	  
Figure 5 shows the location of groundwater basins in central California that have been classified as 
critically overdrafted. Nearly all Central Valley basins south of the delta fall into this category. 
Figure	  5.	  Location	  of	  critically	  overdrafted	  basins	  in	  Central	  California	  
Source:	  http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/pdfs/GW_basinsCriticalOverdraft_SCentralRegion.pdf.	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Attributes common to basins in California’s Central Valley include 
•   Relatively large irrigation communities and cities; 
•   Access to both surface and groundwater, with a strong dependence on access to groundwater 
during drought; 
•   A wide variety of permanent and annual crop types; 
•   Large belts of near-continuous irrigation; and 
•   Significant overdraft that, in some areas, has led to land subsidence. 
As with the coastal case study, the discussion below is hypothetical and bears no resemblance to any 
single basin. Our aim is to reveal the full range of challenges faced in the Central Valley and, through 
this, show how various features of the roadmap enable the resolution of these challenges. In our 
hypothetical basin (Figure 6), there are five broad land categories: (1) land never irrigated, (2) land 
irrigated only from a groundwater well, (3) land irrigated by a mix of surface and groundwater, (4) 
land that relies solely on water from a surface water supply, and (5) urban land. 
There are several large cities and many small towns in the basin. One of the larger cities sources water 
both from groundwater and surface water. The surface water arrives from the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains to the east by way of the Central Valley Project. 
Figure	  6.	  Simplified	  mock-­‐up	  of	  a	  typical	  Central	  Valley	  groundwater	  basin	  
 
In this hypothetical Central Valley basin, there are two aquifers, a confined aquifer and an unconfined 
aquifer. At present, the confined aquifer is used only for domestic water supply and is not being 
overdrafted. To achieve the long-term sustainability goal, groundwater use has to be reduced by 40% 
from 500,000 acre-feet to around 300,000 acre-feet. The main canal that brings water into the basin is 
lined, but several of the lateral ditches are not, and losses from these ditches play an important role in 
topping up the unconfined aquifer. Surface irrigation water is supplied to the basin through three 
separate irrigation districts that source their water from the Central Valley project. 
A wide variety of crops are grown in the district, including alfalfa, almonds, cherries, corn, cotton, 
grapes, kiwi, olives, oranges, pistachios, plums, prunes, tangerines, walnuts, and wheat. In addition to 
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these crops, there are three large feedlot dairies and a power station that uses water for cooling. All 
but two vineyards have their own wineries. There is a cotton gin and 23 packing sheds. 
Outside the urban area, there are 1,500 land parcels under irrigation and 200 other (nonirrigated) land 
parcels. 
In the southern corner of the basin, the U.S. Air Force has a large defense facility that has been 
drawing around 1,800 acre-feet per year from the basin and that has no connection to a surface water 
supply. 
(1)   There is a small Native American community living in one part of the basin on its own land. 
(2)   Since 2000 and as the water table has dropped, 300 domestic groundwater users have seen 
their wells go dry. 
(3)   The three irrigation districts have been operating a water bank for the past 20 years and have 
six major customers who store excess surface water in the basin for later withdrawal during 
times of drought. 
Governance	  and	  Funding	  
The development of governance arrangements for the basin were more complex for the Central Valley 
basin than they were for the coastal basin. The number of stakeholders involved was much larger, and 
considerable effort was put into dealing with the challenges presented by a mixture of surface and 
groundwater supplies, as well as the complexities of adjacent interbasin connections. Just when it 
looked like progress was being made, several prominent academics argued that the scale was all 
wrong and that it was incumbent on the counties to set up a single GSA responsible for preparing a 
plan for the entire San Joaquin Valley. Easily said—but, in practice, much harder to do. 
Ultimately, it was decided that decisions had to be made and that it was best to start at the subbasin 
scale, encouraging each subbasin to follow a similar planning process and, once groundwater use was 
under control, find a way to bring each subbasin into an integrated planning system. “It would be 
foolhardy to try to do everything at once,” they said. “Each basin first has to build a system that 
enables the volume of groundwater each person uses to be recorded and overall use to be regulated.” 
The academics’ recommendation was rejected. 
“Construction of a fully integrated system can wait,” it was said. “It would be crazy to attempt to do 
everything at once. Let’s not put the cart before the horse.” 
A	  Basin	  Plan	  
In our hypothetical basin, the three cities, three irrigation districts, two grower organizations, the 
Native American community, the defense facility, and the corporation that owned the power station 
came together to form a GSA. As with the coastal basin, the legal structure involved the county and 
the groundwater-using cities entering into a joint powers agreement that would enable this entity to 
agree to work with the other organizations via a memorandum of understanding. The main thing that 
all organizations wanted was a say in who was appointed to the basin authority. They did not want 
any financial or legal liability. 
A basin authority and a watermaster were appointed, and they quickly began work. Before starting on 
the plan, they soon realized that consultants should be appointed to assist the authority to work out 
how many zones to establish, what exchange rates to set, and how their allocation decisions might be 
affected by those made in other basins. As several nearby GSAs were seeking answers to the same 
questions, a firm was retained to provide advice to them all on a cost-sharing basis. These same GSAs 
also all agreed to appoint a single company to supply all the computing systems needed to build their 
share allocation databases and to share registers, water accounting systems, and reporting systems. 
Initially, it had been hoped that the Department of Water Resources would provide the computing 
systems needed to establish register and water accounts, but as discussions progressed, it became clear 
	  40	  
that the state was not yet ready to do this. “Let many flowers bloom,” the department said. They 
wanted local basin authorities to test alternative systems. The department did, however, agree to 
specify a protocol that, if followed, would enable the state to guarantee the integrity of share registers 
and water accounts. In practice, this had the same effect. A subsequent court case found that by 
approving the plan the state also guaranteed the integrity of share registers. 
With the basin zone boundary and exchange rate issues resolved, a final plan was prepared and 
quickly approved by the department. This included an arrangement that required the department to 
ratify plan amendments within 30 days. When agreeing to this arrangement, the department stated that 
it was “very keen to give the proposed local basin authority every opportunity to succeed.”  
While all this was happening, a lunch among the chairs of the boards of supervisors for Kern, Kings, 
Tulare, and Fresno Counties produced a suggestion that it would be better for the valley if all GSAs 
adopted a common share allocation formula. To this end, they would try to persuade their basin 
authorities to appoint an independent share allocation panel to recommend the most appropriate share 
allocation method to adopt. 
The decision to manage the effects of one basin’s plan on all other basins worked out. There had 
always been a healthy sense of cooperation among the valley’s irrigation districts. As one of the 
county supervisors said, “People exchange information because it makes sense to do so. They don’t 
when they are ordered to do so. There is no need for top-down direction on issues like this. In fact, it 
would be counterproductive.” 
Issuing	  Shares	  in	  the	  Confined	  Aquifer	  
To date, use of the confined aquifer underlying the basin had been restricted to domestic, commercial, 
and industrial purposes. Many were of the view that more use of this aquifer could be possible. 
In recognition of these considerations and the fact that it was thought that this confined aquifer was 
made up largely of fossil water and knowledge about it was limited, it was decided to declare this 
aquifer a separate groundwater resource. Sixty percent of the shares were issued to existing users and 
40% to the county for sale whenever the county thought it appropriate to do so. 
Issuing	  Shares	  in	  the	  Unconfined	  Aquifer	  
The report from the independent share allocation panel was well received. The panel recommended 
use of a formula that, to an outsider, looked similar to the one used in the coastal basin. In essence, it 
recommended recognition of (a) existing users, and (b) an underlying groundwater right correlated 
with land area that many considered to have been established in the law. 
As with the coastal basin, it was recommended that each groundwater user be given a start-up 10% 
allocation buffer and that, at least for the first two years, rollout of the new system should cause 
minimum disruption. 
Differing from the coast, however, the panel recommended the collection of actual data on water use 
for each of the previous seven years including five before SGMA had been adopted by the legislature. 
This was possible as a number of the irrigation districts had been experimenting with the use of 
satellite imagery to estimate water use and had found it to be reliable. It was possible to use satellite 
imagery coupled with data held by each water district to reconstruct a historical record. 
On a land-parcel-by-land parcel basis, the total amount of water used for each of the previous seven 
years was entered into a database and the amount of surface water that each district had supplied to 
that parcel subtracted. The resulting database reported on groundwater use by land parcel. Share 
entitlements, it was recommended, should include an arrangement based on the average proportion of 
ground and surface water use. At the same time, the nature of the crop and the efficiency of water use 
on each parcel were recorded. Data on water use efficiency and crop type proved to be important. 
Permanent crop irrigators with state-of-the-art drip irrigation systems argued that they deserved a 
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greater share allocation than those with older flood and spray irrigation systems who could make 
savings when they upgraded. 
In addition, a way had to be found to accommodate the concerns of several irrigators who had decided 
to transition from growing alfalfa to growing less water-intensive almonds. Their conversion from 
alfalfa to almonds involved leaving land fallow for a year while a new drip irrigation system was 
installed and then planting trees less than a few feet tall. These small almond trees would use very 
little water but, when they fully grown, would use nearly as much water as alfalfa. 
With all these discussions going on, the basin authority was pleased that they had left resolution of all 
these challenges to an independent panel. Engagement on this issue needed to be managed carefully. 
Highly skilled professional advice was needed. 
Early in the process, the panel was made very aware that they would need to be careful when deciding 
how many shares to allocate to new irrigators. One of these new irrigators had purchased a large area 
of undeveloped land in 2014 and, in 2015, had begun converting one square mile of this land into an 
almond plantation. Groundwater use in the last year according to the owner was 0.3 acre-feet per acre. 
When the trees were in full production, however, he was planning to use 3.5 acre-feet per acre per 
year. The panel needed to decide if investments like this deserved nothing because the transition 
began after SGMA was passed or if investments like this should be recognized. 
The formula recommended by the panel proposed that, initially, each groundwater user be granted 
shares in proportion to an independent estimate of best irrigation practice for each crop type in the 
hottest of the last seven years and a 10% start-up buffer allocation too. 
To fairly account for differences in the age of permanent plantations, each water user would have his 
or her start-up buffer adjusted so that no permanent plantation owner would experience a windfall 
gain or loss. Owners of young permanent plantations would see their initial allocations per share 
increase as their trees grew. Owners of old, inefficient plantations would receive an additional top-up 
allocation in proportion to the maximum amount of water they used in the last seven years. These 
share allocation adjustments, it was recommended, should be phased out after five years. 
The final part of the formula added a process that would reallocate a small proportion of each 
shareholding in proportion to parcel area. This final part of the formula, it was argued, recognized the 
underlying right but did it in a manner that did not force a sudden change. It was recommended that 
this reallocation mechanism only apply to the owners of irrigable land greater than five acres in area. 
That is, the owners on nonirrigable hills, for instance, would be excluded. After much discussion, it 
was concluded that 1.1% of each shareholding be reallocated in proportion to parcel area for each of 
the first ten years of full implementation. Most dryland landowners and those who had only been 
using surface water thought that this should have been around 2%. 
In addition to this transition arrangement, the panel recommended that a volume of groundwater be 
set aside in a special reserve that could be issued on the basis of land area if a severe drought emerged 
during the transition period. This, the panel reasoned, would be equitable, as some landholders only 
use groundwater in times of extreme water shortage, and this had not happened in recent years. Until 
the transition had been completed, these land holders could be disadvantaged unfairly. 
When presenting its final report, the panel warned all that everyone should be very careful before 
jumping to conclusions. To work out, selfishly, which variant of the formula was best for oneself, one 
either needed a computer or a mind that could keep track of 1,700 histories of water use and knew 
how efficient each user was and what crops each person was growing. After careful consideration, the 
panel’s recommendations were accepted and the plan amended so that the watermaster could build the 
register and give everyone involved a water account. 
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As the watermaster started to roll out the share register, it became apparent that there were still a few 
unregistered wells and some people still trying to increase their entitlements by sinking new wells. As 
the number of unregistered wells was few, and each appeared to have been sunk a long time ago, a 
quasiamnesty was declared and completion permits issued for these wells. Those still trying to 
increase their share entitlements by pumping were told that the basin authority’s decision on the 
formula was final. 
Share allocations made to municipal water users in the basin, wineries, feed lots, dairies, fruit packing 
sheds, the cotton gin, and the power station proved to be noncontroversial, and in essence, shares were 
issued to each of them in proportion to the maximum volume extracted over the previous five years. 
The U.S. defense base, as it was in the bottom corner of the basin, was split off as a separate zone. 
Several of the people involved in the process commented that it was pleasing to see the federal 
government subject to the same groundwater use regulations as everyone else. 
Domestic	  Groundwater	  Users	  
With a large, articulate, and well-organized group of domestic groundwater users in the basin it soon 
became clear that these users had to be fully involved in developing the plan and, in particular, in 
developing the arrangements that affected them directly. To this end, the authority decided to include 
three domestic water users on its stakeholder reference panel. 
After much discussion, the cities involved convinced the basin authority that all domestic water use 
should be metered so that programs could be put in place to encourage conservation. There was much 
interest among several nongovernmental organizations on the effects that the entire sharing scheme 
might have on disadvantaged households. 
Ultimately, these nongovernmental organizations concluded that all households, including those that 
rented a house, would benefit from the transition to a suite of arrangements that would bring an end to 
a decline in the depth of the water tables. Predictably, some domestic water users quickly began to 
focus on the work leading up to setting the absolute maximum depth to the water table that the draft 
plan proposed for each zone. The county also became interested in this number as it offered an 
important way to reduce the impacts of land subsidence on road maintenance costs. 
Significantly, the issuing of shares to counties and cities enabled them to arrange for some domestic 
groundwater users to be connected to a municipal supply system at much less cost than deepening 
their wells. As this occurred, the county transferred the water shares being held on behalf of these 
domestic users to the local municipal water purveyor. 
Outcomes	  
This Central Valley basin received international acclaim among professional facilitators. New 
consultation and negotiation practices were tried, and they worked. Early on, those responsible 
decided that it would be critical to build a sense of trust, fairness, and deep understanding of the 
process. This challenge was taken seriously. Some of the world’s leading experts were brought in to 
assist with the process. There was broad acceptance of the outcome, especially among landowners 
who had not sunk a well but who had begun to receive shares from the reallocation process. 
Three years after the sharing system was implemented, a review survey found that 90% wanted to stay 
with the new system and find ways to improve it. 
As the new system was put in place, interest grew in the new arrangement that allowed the efficient 
banking of surface water. Very quickly, two of the irrigation companies applied for credit for leakage 
occurring from their unlined ditches. Rather than retaining this water, they transfered it to their 
irrigators on a pro rata basis. Each member of the basin was finding reasons to like the new system, 
which proved much more effective than the water banking system they had been running. 
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With much better information on the efficiency of water use on each parcel, a new team of irrigation 
technology advisors moved into the district. This generated considerable growth and optimism. 
Unexpected support came from the banking sector. Impressed by the integrity of the new share 
registers and the competence of the local basin authority, they began to lend more money than they 
had been prepared to in previous years. 
The banking industry also became interested in growing awareness of the ability of the new sharing 
system to grant landowners a permit to proceed with a new development without purchasing a water 
right. A mature market for both shares and allocations was established quite quickly. As a result, a 
few growers stopped worrying about water supply issues. Groundwater use was becoming the smart 
way to go as, unlike in the case of surface water, third-party court actions were rare. 
Finally, with access to the surface water system and interest in storage, all the districts involved 
decided to move more quickly to resolve the overdraft problem at the valley level. This proved 
relatively easy as a number of basin authority members sat on several authorities, and a few were 
using the same watermaster. In 2030, serious discussion about the best way to form a locally 
controlled Central Valley groundwater basin authority began. 
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BROAD	  CONSIDERATIONS	  	  
Context	  
This working paper has focused on options for development of a generic roadmap for the sustainable 
management of California’s groundwater resources at the local level. The roadmap presented here has 
been prepared primarily by those in the process of forming sustainable groundwater agencies, but a 
number of opportunities are available to the state of California to help expedite progress. These 
include helping to build trust in sharing systems, undertaking not to extinguish existing rights, and 
helping with the development of registers and accounting systems. Each of these statewide 
opportunities, however, need to be considered with care. Retention of SGMA’s success is contingent 
on retention of a strong sense of local ownership. 
Building	  Trust	  	  
The roadmap has been crafted so as to build a strong sense of local trust and respect. To this end, it is 
suggested that the role of the department be one of ratifying plans like the one attached to this report, 
not approving them, and that the state not be allowed to procrastinate. The suggested water accounting 
system in particular has been designed to enable individual water users to respond continuously to 
changing conditions. SGMA has a strong local emphasis. Once the department has approved the 
initial plan, it has suggested that amendments to plan annexes be left to a basin authority who has to, 
among other things, retain the support of both local shareholders and the organizations that form the 
GSA that appointed them. 
Similarly, once an initial plan has been approved, it is suggested that the department signal that it 
expects local basin authorities to be both accountable and responsible for their decisions. It is 
therefore suggested as well that departmental approval of any proposed amendment plan to take the 
form of ratification necessary only to bring legal effect to the proposed amendments. 
Protecting	  Existing	  Rights	  
A related issue is the question of what SGMA means for existing groundwater rights, which, in many 
areas, are unclear. 
To increase confidence in the proposed water sharing arrangement, the roadmap contains a clause 
that, if approved, would certify that no existing water right may be extinguished or curtailed as a 
result of a decision to comply with this plan. State willingness to agree to an arrangement like this 
would do much to build confidence and trust. To this end, it may be possible for the state water board 
to issue a resolution to practice a policy of nonintervention in basins that are managed by the proposed 
sharing system with compliance upheld locally and effectively by the GSA. 
Information	  Management	  
Ultimately, SGMA can be expected to bring significant long-term benefits to local communities, in 
light of which funding is available to assist local communities to collect the information necessary to 
put new systems in place. If adoption of the suggested water sharing approach is widespread, then 
around 100 basins will have to all establish new share registers, water accounting systems, permit 
registers, and client communication systems. Some of these may be most efficiently built at the local 
level; others will be most efficiently built once and then supplied to all. 
In essence, there are two options. Either this can be left for each basin to resolve on its own or some 
of these steps can be managed centrally with a view to reducing costs and the emergence of systems 
that can be coordinated. 
As a bare minimum, consideration needs to be given to the benefits of standardizing software so that 
the recording systems chosen enable the low-cost migration of data from one system to another—
unless, of course, all basin agencies are required to use the same system. The state or counties could 
come together and run a competition inviting firms to offer to supply such a system by a certain date, 
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choose the preferred supplier or suppliers, and then contract for this system to be supplied to all GSAs 
that would like to use it. 
Issuing	  Shares	  
When considering the nature of the registers to be built, it will be important to decide who is 
responsible for creating and issuing shares and allocations. Some people are of the view that, as the 
state created SGMA and issues water rights, it is the state that should guarantee the integrity of each 
share register. If the state is responsible, then market confidence would be greater if the integrity of 
the processes used are guaranteed by the state. For a guarantee to be given, legislation enabling basin 
authorities to issue shares on behalf of the state may be necessary. If the concepts suggested in this 
report are adopted, groundwater shares would become valuable assets worth billions of dollars at the 
state level. 
The other view is that counties or basin authorities should assume full legal responsibility for creating 
share registers and the water accounting systems associated with them. If this latter path is taken, then 
international experience would suggest that shares will be of lesser value and confidence in the entire 
sharing system will be less. 
Either way, there will be significant benefits to the development of a process that reduces the need for 
each basin authority or GSA to reinvent the wheel. Australian experience suggests that there is a 
strong case for standardization—especially in regions where there is surface or groundwater 
interconnectivity. In Australia, water share registers and most water accounting systems are computer-
based and maintained by the state.42 
Torrens	  Title–Like	  Registers	  
This report proposes that any register established under SGMA be built in a manner that is consistent 
with Torrens title land registration principles. Pure Torrens title land registration systems are not used 
in the United States. A few states do use Quasi-Torrens title systems—each administered by a court. 
These systems, however, run into problems because of the way land titles have been granted and 
recorded over the last few centuries. These historical problems can be avoided by starting from 
scratch. 
In essence, a Torrens title registration system has two prime characteristics: the integrity of the 
register is guaranteed, and any interest not recorded on the register is invalid. 
Under a Torrens title system, what you see is what you have. There is no need for any title searches 
and so on. There is no transaction risk. 
In practice, this means that if you want to acquire a water share, for example, you contract to change 
the register and pay for the share as the name on the register is changed. This change will be made, 
however, only if all parties with a registered interest in a share agree to the change. In the case of a 
mortgage, for example, a bank could be expected to agree to a change only if all the money owed to it 
is returned to it at the time the change is made. 
If California could legislate to enable the construction of Torrens title–like water registers, it would 
significantly reduce the cost of trading shares and, by making it possible to mortgage shares at low 
cost, both increase their value and, because banks would charge less, increase investment. The only 
loser from the development of such systems would be the legal profession, which would arguably 
have a lesser role to play in groundwater management. With time and if the necessary legislation is 
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written with care, it would be possible for the state to start a process that enables the conversion of 
“old system water rights into new ones of guaranteed integrity at much less cost to all than the current 
adjudication methods used by the courts.”43  
Once the necessary legislation has been passed, the state could delegate responsibility for maintaining 
share registers to counties. 
System-­‐to-­‐System	  Interaction	  
The last issue to raise is the question of how best to manage the effect that allocation decisions made 
in one basin have on other basins and the surface water systems associated with them. The roadmap’s 
architecture does this by enabling water to be transferred from one basin to another, for shares to be 
moved from one basin to another, and for the boundary of any basin to be modified. 
These arrangements, however, do not deal with the question of how, specifically and hydraulically, 
water flows from one “basin” to another. The structure of the road map is such, though, that adjacent 
basin authorities could come to an agreement that places limits on the extent of drawdown permitted.44 
If voluntary agreement cannot be reached, then there may be a case for the development of 
governance arrangements that enable water allocation decisions to be managed at the basin level. 
Reforms of the magnitude envisaged by SGMA are, however, more like a journey involving many 
steps. This first step is to find a way to monitor groundwater use and bring it under control. Once this 
has been done in a manner that brings confidence and trust, the next steps should become easier. This 
report’s roadmap is a first step. 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  The	  Australian	  state	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  has	  a	  process	  that	  enables	  conversion.	  The	  holder	  of	  an	  old	  system	  title	  can	  
apply	  to	  have	  it	  converted	  into	  a	  new	  system	  title.	  To	  do	  this,	  people	  make	  an	  appropriate	  application	  that	  includes	  as	  
much	  information	  as	  they	  can	  find	  about	  the	  land	  title	  they	  think	  they	  hold,	  and	  a	  provisional	  new	  title	  is	  issued	  by	  an	  
appropriately	  trained	  officer.	  The	  state	  then	  conducts	  an	  appropriate	  search	  and,	  ultimately,	  the	  old	  title	  is	  formally	  
extinguished	  and	  the	  provisional	  caution	  removed	  from	  the	  new	  system	  title.	  
44	  The	  Department	  of	  Water	  Resources	  has	  already	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  such	  agreements	  in	  its	  GSP	  Emergency	  
Regulations.	  Article	  8	  describes	  the	  two	  primary	  forms	  of	  interagency	  agreements,	  namely,	  “Interbasin	  Agreements”	  that	  
recognize	  the	  benefit	  of	  cooperation	  for	  GSAs	  in	  hydrologically	  connected	  basins	  (§357.2)	  and	  “Coordination	  Agreements”	  
that	  are	  necessary	  should	  multiple	  plans	  be	  developed	  to	  manage	  a	  single	  basin	  (§357.4).	  See	  
http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/pdfs/GSP_Emergency_Regulations.pdf.	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APPENDIX:	  MOCKUP	  OF	  A	  GROUNDWATER	  SUSTAINABILITY	  PLAN	  FOR	  THE	  ABC	  BASIN	  
	  
1.   This groundwater sustainability plan was prepared by the ABC Groundwater Sustainability 
Agency in consultation with local water users, stakeholders, and community groups. The plan 
establishes a set of administrative and regulatory arrangements necessary to bring 
groundwater use and conservation of the ABC groundwater resources within sustainable 
limits. 
2.   This ABC Basin Groundwater Sustainability Plan is consistent with the provisions of the 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and regulations of the Department of Water 
Resources. 
3.   This plan seeks to bring use of the ABC groundwater resource within sustainable limits by 
2040.45 It does this primarily by starting the processes necessary to enable a suite of 
administrative arrangements and market-based regulations to be placed over existing and, as 
of yet, largely unregulated groundwater rights. The plan is structured in a manner that 
incentivizes the search for cost-effective ways to use groundwater and bring groundwater use 
within a sustainable range. Augmentation from surface water flows is encouraged. 
4.   It is anticipated that implementation of this plan will proceed in two phases. In the first phase, 
arrangements will be put in place to establish the regulatory and administrative systems and 
infrastructure necessary to bring this plan fully into effect. This will include establishing an 
independent authority whose members will appoint a watermaster and will be responsible for 
putting in place all the arrangements necessary to enable full implementation of this plan. 
Toward the end of this implementation phase, it is anticipated that this plan will be reviewed 
and, if necessary, amended so as to ensure that it can come into full regulatory effect as 
efficiently as possible. 
5.   This plan will come into full regulatory effect when the authority finalizes the proposed share 
allocation and makes a volumetric allocation to each share holding. 
Vision	  Statement	  
Note: Visions are best developed in close consultation with a wide range of stakeholders. Some GSAs 
may prefer to develop a mission statement, a charter, or both. At best, this section is illustrative of 
what might emerge from such a process. 
6.   Water right holders, water users, and community residents in the ABC Groundwater Basin 
wish to ensure that groundwater use in its region (1) makes the greatest contribution possible 
to local, state, and national prosperity; (2) is kept within sustainable limits; and (3) has no 
undesirable results.46  
7.   This vision and its implied outcomes will be achieved by establishing a set of robust water 
sharing, allocation, and management arrangements that regulate access to groundwater. 
8.   It is understood that if one person wants access to a larger share of a water resource, then 
someone else must accept a smaller share. It is also understood that the systems put in place 
must impose an absolute limit on the amount of groundwater that may be consumed in any 
year and that, as climatic conditions change and knowledge about the aquifer improves, this 
absolute limit may need to be revised. These two realities need to be recognized and a system 
put in place to ensure that all groundwater is put to its best social, economic, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Some	  basins	  have	  until	  2042	  to	  achieve	  this	  requirement.	  	  
46	  A	  reference	  to	  national	  prosperity	  may	  be	  needed	  only	  when	  groundwater	  basins	  cross	  state	  borders	  or	  when	  surface	  
water	  from	  another	  state	  might	  be	  used	  to	  recharge	  an	  aquifer.	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environmental use. This will be achieved through the coupling of the existing water rights 
arrangements with a new regulatory framework. This framework is designed to encourage 
water users to continuously seek opportunities to improve the way water is used and invest in 
water-saving technologies as supply and demand changes. 
9.   This plan envisions a transition to a constellation of regulatory and administrative 
arrangements that reward stewardship, protect the ABC Groundwater Basin from undesirable 
results, and require fiscal prudence. The consultation and engagement processes used are 
intended to establish trust and confidence among groundwater users and other stakeholders. It 
is critical that all entities understand that knowledge about the ABC Basin will never be 
perfect and that water users need to have decisions affecting water supplies made in a timely 
manner. 
Plan	  Framework 
Note: This section is written as a layperson’s summary of what is planned and intended. 
10.   To bring groundwater use in the ABC Basin within sustainable limits, groundwater users will 
be required to comply with the regulations established through this plan. 
11.   An independent, five-member basin authority will be appointed to work with a watermaster to 
establish a groundwater sharing system in the ABC Basin. The system will be set up during 
2017 and come into full operation at the commencement of the 2018 water year. 
12.   A watermaster, under basin authority direction, will issue shares to all existing water right 
holders in a manner consistent with the final version of this plan. 
13.   Every shareholder will be given a groundwater account and, at the start of each water year, 
the basin authority will make a volumetric allocation to these accounts in proportion to the 
number of shares held. 
14.   Shareholders will be free to choose whether or not to use, save, or, by way of transfer, sell any 
allocations made to their water account. Adjusted only for hydrological losses, account 
holders will be allowed to carry forward unused water allocations from one water year to the 
next. 
15.   Share ownership will be defined by reference to the ABC Basin Share Register. Any claimed 
interest in an ABC Basin share shall be deemed to be invalid unless it is recorded in the ABC 
Basin Share Register. 
16.   To take water from a well, a landowner must hold a groundwater use permit, domestic 
groundwater use permit, or de minimis groundwater use permit. Each groundwater use permit 
will be linked to an ABC Basin Groundwater Account. 
17.   Groundwater recharge projects will be encouraged. Groundwater recharge projects will be 
assigned a groundwater account and allocations credited to these accounts as recharge occurs. 
18.   Location-specific conditions in groundwater use permits will manage undesirable local effects 
including seawater intrusion, cones of depression, migration of contaminant plumes, and land 
subsidence. 
19.   The integrity of the ABC Basin Share Register and water accounting system will be 
guaranteed by the state of California. 
20.   Allocations will be made to groundwater accounts on an annual basis according to rules 
established in an annual water allocation framework. 
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21.   Unless exempted by holding a domestic groundwater or de minimis groundwater use permit, 
no legal entity will be allowed to take water from a well in the ABC Groundwater Basin 
unless (1) the landowner where the well is situated holds a groundwater use permit 
authorizing the taking of water from that well and (2) the water account associated with the 
relevant land parcel has a positive water allocation. 
22.   XYZ County and the city of EFG will be required to maintain a water account with a positive 
water allocation to offset the effects of their own groundwater use, domestic groundwater use 
community projects, and environmental projects on water supplies. If allocations per share are 
reduced to zero, then domestic and de minimis groundwater use will be constrained but not 
completely curtailed. 
23.   Landowners who unintentionally allow the balance of their water account to become negative 
have 30 days to make good. If they cannot do this, they may borrow from the next year’s 
allocation with a two-for-one penalty. Intentional overuse will result in a three-for-one penalty 
and suspension of the relevant groundwater use permit until the relevant water account is 
returned to a nonnegative balance. 
24.   This plan is designed to enable water users to plan for droughts and, hence, they may not be 
suspended by the Department of Water Resources following the proclamation of a state 
emergency or local emergency because of the severity of drought conditions. 
25.   A mix of fees, charges, and grants will likely be used to fund implementation. 
Purpose	  of	  Plan	  and	  Goals	  
Avoiding	  Undesirable	  Results	  
26.   Consistent with the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and resultant administrative 
decisions, the purpose of this groundwater sustainability plan is to incentivize investment in 
water-using activities and water use so as to avoid six undesirable results. These undesirable 
results or outcomes are 
•   Significant and unreasonable depletion of groundwater levels; 
•   Significant and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage; 
•   Significant and unreasonable land subsidence that substantially interferes with surface 
land uses; 
•   Extraction or use of groundwater that has significant and unreasonable adverse impacts 
on beneficial uses of surface water; 
•   Significant and unreasonable seawater intrusion; and 
•   Significant and unreasonable degradation of water quality, including the migration of 
contaminant plumes that impair groundwater supplies. 
Sustainability	  Goal	  
27.   The sustainability goal of this plan is to bring the water budget or net water withdrawals, 
inflows, and outflows of water into balance before 2040. This goal is to be achieved in a 
manner that recognizes the capacity of the basin to accommodate further drawdowns; the 
economic, social, and environmental consequences of transitioning to a balanced groundwater 
use system; consequences for surface water supplies; impacts on water quality; and changes in 
the demand and supply of water in the face of climatic variability. 
28.   The plan’s sustainability objectives47 are to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Attention	  to	  undesirable	  results	  is	  required	  in	  legislation.	  The	  undesired	  seawater	  intrusion	  result	  could	  be	  deleted	  in	  
basins	  not	  adjacent	  to	  the	  coast.	  Other	  goals	  are	  negotiable.	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•   Avoid the six undesirable results and minimize the risk that they might occur; 
•   Encourage economically efficient groundwater use and investment in the ABC Basin; 
•   Encourage water users and investors to search for ways to conserve water; 
•   Facilitate continuous adjustment as water supply and demand conditions change; 
•   Provide for opportunities for people to secure access to groundwater in a fair and 
equitable manner; and 
•   Maintain local control of groundwater management. 
29.   It is recognized that all people should have an opportunity to access sufficient water to meet 
essential household needs. 
Zones	  
30.   The regulations in this plan apply only to the groundwater resources located in the ABC 
Groundwater Basin as determined by the boundaries shown on the map in Annex  2. 
31.   To enable the effective management of this basin, the ABC Groundwater Basin shall be 
divided into management zones and aquifers as shown in Annex 2, with each zone and 
aquifer treated separately.48 
ABC	  Groundwater	  Basin	  Authority	  
32.   The ABC Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency shall establish an independent, skills-
based ABC Basin Authority to give effect to this plan. 
33.   The basin authority shall be responsible for ensuring that progress toward this plan’s goals are 
measured and achieved in a timely manner. 
34.   The basin authority shall consult with the ABC Groundwater Sustainability Agency on a 
regular basis. 
35.   All decisions made by the basin authority shall be in accordance with the rules set out in this 
plan as constrained by the annual allocation plan framework in Annex 1. 
36.   Allocation decisions made in a manner consistent with this plan shall be final and cannot be 
overridden by the ABC Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency. 
37.   Composition of the Basin Authority and Appointment of Members 
38.   The basin authority shall consist of a chair, four independent members, and a watermaster. 
39.   The basin authority shall appoint its watermaster, and this person shall be an employee of the 
organization. The watermaster shall be a nonvoting, ex officio member of the basin authority. 
40.   The chair and members of the basin authority are to be chosen so as to ensure that basin 
authority members, collectively, have expertise in 
 
•   Community leadership, engagement, and consultation, 
•   Policy administration, 
•   Water resources management, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  As	  a	  guiding	  principle,	  in	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  this	  plan,	  more	  rather	  than	  fewer	  zones	  should	  be	  established.	  If	  a	  
subsequent	  hydrological	  review	  finds	  that	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  two	  zones	  is	  feasible	  and	  the	  exchange	  rate	  for	  the	  transfer	  
of	  water	  allocations	  from	  one	  zone	  to	  another	  is	  feasible,	  then	  the	  zones	  may	  be	  amalgamated	  and	  the	  shares	  in	  each	  zone	  
converted	  into	  shares	  in	  the	  combined	  zone	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  value	  of	  any	  shareholding.	  The	  same	  
logic	  applies	  to	  hydrologically	  distinct	  aquifers.	  If,	  for	  example,	  an	  unconfined	  aquifer	  is	  sitting	  on	  top	  of	  a	  confined	  aquifer,	  
then	  shares	  would	  be	  allocated	  to	  each	  aquifer.	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•   Environmental management, 
•   Irrigated agriculture and associated water supply systems, 
•   Urban and industrial water supply and management, 
•   Hydrology, 
•   Water law, and 
§   Financial management. 
41.   When appointing the basin authority, the ABC Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency 
shall call for applications from people interested in becoming a member of the basin authority. 
The agency or any person acting on behalf of the agency may approach potential candidates 
on a confidential basis. 
42.   Neither the chair nor any independent member of the basin authority may be appointed for 
more than five years. The basin authority chair and all independent members shall be eligible 
for reappointment.49 Initial appointment periods are to be staggered so as to establish 
continuity in knowledge at an early stage. 
43.   Basin authority members shall be paid and shall be entitled to have any expenses they 
reasonably incur reimbursed. 
Quorum	  
44.   The basin authority may not vote on any issue unless three voting members are present. 
No	  Conflict	  of	  Interest	  Allowed	  
45.   No member of the basin authority shall 
•   Be appointed as a representative of an interest group or an organization; 
•   Have a direct interest in using more than five acre-feet of water per year in the ABC 
Basin; or 
•   Hold more than 1% of the shares in any zone. 
Equitable	  Decision-­‐Making	  Processes	  
46.   The basin authority shall consult widely with all shareholders, water users, and those people 
living in the basin. 
47.   In consultation with the ABC Groundwater Sustainability Agency, the basin authority shall 
appoint a community reference panel to assist it in its deliberations. 
48.   The basin authority shall make every effort to make and announce its decisions in a manner 
that gives all shareholders and all water users equal opportunity to profit from its decisions. 
49.   When meeting to determine or discuss how much groundwater to allocate to shareholders, to 
revise carryforward rules, to set exchange rates, or for any other matter likely to influence 
share and or allocation prices, the basin authority may meet behind closed doors.50 
50.   The basin authority shall keep minutes of its meetings and shall make the results of its 
deliberations available to the public in a timely manner. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  A	  default	  suggestion	  would	  be	  to	  appoint	  the	  chair	  for	  five	  years	  and	  the	  other	  members	  for	  one,	  two,	  three,	  and	  four	  
years.	  A	  nonbinding	  administrative	  understanding	  that	  the	  member	  only	  appointed	  for	  one	  year	  could	  expect	  to	  be	  
reappointed	  for	  a	  subsequent	  five-­‐year	  period	  could	  be	  communicated	  to	  candidates.	  
50	  If	  this	  arrangement	  is	  not	  possible,	  then	  an	  astute	  authority	  would	  notify	  all	  shareholders	  that	  they	  are	  about	  to	  make	  a	  
decision	  that	  might	  affect	  share	  or	  allocation	  values.	  In	  extreme	  circumstances,	  and	  if	  the	  authority	  is	  unable	  to	  meet	  
behind	  closed	  doors,	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  suspend	  share	  and	  allocation	  trading	  until	  the	  relevant	  decision	  has	  been	  
made	  and	  announced.	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51.   If the basin authority chair is unable to be present at a meeting of the basin authority, then he 
or she may appoint any other member of the basin authority other than the watermaster to act 
as the basin authority’s chair.51 
Periodic	  Plan	  Reviews	  	  
52.   The basin authority may commission a review of the plan at any point in time and for any 
reason. 
53.   In the six-month period before this plan comes into full effect, during the fourth year of the 
full operation of this plan and every five years thereafter, the basin authority shall commission 
an independent assessment of the effectiveness of this plan and the processes associated with 
it. 
54.   The terms of reference for the independent assessment shall require that the public be invited 
to suggest ways to improve the plan. 
55.   Within seven days of receiving the independent assessor’s final report, the basin authority 
shall forward the assessment to the Department of Water Resources and the ABC Basin 
Groundwater Management Agency and make the assessment public. 
56.   Within 30 days of receiving the independent assessor’s final report, the basin authority shall 
announce how it intends to respond to the assessment and, if appropriate, how it intends to 
involve stakeholders in a plan amendment process. 
Plan	  Amendment	  Process	  
Note: As drafted, only the basin authority or an administrator can commence the plan amendment 
process. All other organizations, including the Department of Water Resources, can only recommend 
that the basin authority consider amending the plan. 
57.   In the process of approving this plan, the Department of Water Resources authorizes the basin 
authority to amend any annexes to this plan and add additional annexes to this plan.52 
58.   If the basin authority considers that there may be a case for amending this plan, it shall inform 
all shareholders and holders of a basin groundwater use permit that the basin authority is 
considering amending the plan and why it proposes to do so and shall allow at least 30 days 
for submissions about the nature of the amendments under consideration. During this 
consultation period, any person may propose that the basin authority consider amending other 
features of this plan. 
59.   Having fully considered any submissions received, the basin authority shall then decide 
whether or not to propose amendments to the plan. If the basin authority proposes to amend 
this plan, then it shall prepare and publicize its proposed amendments and allow at least 45 
days for all stakeholders to consider and respond in writing to its proposed amendments. This 
consultation period shall include a public meeting with the ABC Groundwater Sustainability 
Agency. 
60.   Following consideration of any submissions received and comments made by the ABC 
Groundwater Sustainability Agency, and at least 90 days after providing notice to a city or 
county subject to this plan, the basin authority shall publish its proposed amendments. 
61.   If the amendment is to one of the plan’s annexes or adds an annex to the plan, this amendment 
shall be final when a notice to that effect is published on the basin authority’s website and all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  The	  watermaster	  is	  protected	  from	  being	  placed	  in	  a	  position	  where	  he	  or	  she	  has	  to	  defend	  the	  authority’s	  decisions.	  
The	  watermaster’s	  task	  is	  to	  implement	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  basin	  authority.	  In	  effect,	  the	  watermaster	  is	  the	  CEO.	  
52	  Annexes,	  when	  added,	  do	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  override	  the	  substantive	  provisions	  and	  operating	  rules	  of	  the	  plan.	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shareholders and every holder of a permit has been sent an email notifying them that the plan 
has been amended. 
62.   If the amendment is to the main body of this plan, then the basin authority shall submit a copy 
of its revised plan to the Department of Water Resources for ratification. 
63.   The Department of Water Resources shall then have 30 days to either ratify the amendments 
or recommend further amendments to the plan. 
64.   If the Department of Water Resources recommends that the basin authority consider making 
further amendments, the basin authority shall consider the need for further revision of the 
plan, make the changes it thinks appropriate, and then resubmit its revised amendments to the 
Department of Water Resources. The Department of Water Resources must then either ratify 
these revisions within 30 days or refer the basin to the State Water Resources Control Board 
with a recommendation that it appoint an administrator to take over the basin authority’s 
functions. 
65.   At any stage during the above process, if the Department of Water Resources fails to respond 
within 30 days, the revised plan, as amended, shall be taken as ratified. 
Water	  Sharing,	  Allocation,	  and	  Accounting	  System	  
Groundwater	  Use	  Permits	  
Note: Groundwater use permits are similar to development or works approvals. They would, for 
example, require the maintenance of a positive volumetric balance in the water account associated 
with this permit and specify how the volume of allocations extracted from the well will be estimated. 
Where necessary, they could set a maximum daily or annual pumping rate so as to prevent 
unreasonable rates of draw down or seawater intrusion. 
66.   During this plan’s start-up period, every landowner with a well shall be issued a groundwater 
use permit authorizing the taking of water from that well. Where appropriate, a permit may 
authorize the taking of water from several wells colocated on the one land parcel. 
67.   Groundwater use permits may be issued only to the owner or owners of land parcels recorded 
in the ABC County Assessor Database. Each permit shall be associated with an assessor’s 
parcel number or numbers as appropriate. 
68.   Any landowner who takes or extracts water from a groundwater source or permits another 
person to do so without a groundwater use permit or in a manner inconsistent with permit 
conditions shall be regarded as in breach of this plan and the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act. That is, it shall be the responsibility of the landowner to ensure that any 
tenants, sharefarmers, workers, subcontractors, and so on, comply with permit conditions. 
69.   For any part of the basin, such as an area where there is known to be plume, seawater 
intrusion, or any other local effect, the basin authority shall develop a policy for the 
management of the effect. This policy shall include a summary of the site-specific conditions 
to be included in relevant groundwater use permits and arrangements for monitoring the 
effectiveness of these conditions. 
70.   All groundwater use permits shall be consistent with 
•   This plan; 
•   Local permitting agency requirements; 
•   ABC County regulations; 
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•   Department of Water Resources Bulletin 74-81 and 74-90 Water Well Standards;53 
•   State and federal regulations pertaining to water use and practices that might affect water 
quality; and 
•   Requirements that any water extracted from a well be put to a reasonable and beneficial 
use. 
71.   Groundwater use permits shall be issued by the watermaster and the master version of each 
permit kept in a publicly accessible electronic database. Each permit shall require that 
•   The current well and associated infrastructure be kept safe and meet the standards set out 
by the Department of Water Resources and the XYZ County Local Permitting Agency at 
the time the well was installed; 
•   The taking of water from the permitted well or wells occur only when there is a positive 
balance in the water account linked to that permit; 
•   Any groundwater extracted from a well be accounted for in a stipulated manner; and 
•   Permit conditions may be revised whenever either this plan is revised or a land-use or 
technical change requires modification of the methods used to estimate net water use. 
72.   To allow management of undesired local effects, a groundwater use permit may set a 
maximum annual, monthly, or daily limit on the amount of water extracted from the well or 
wells covered by that permit. 
Domestic	  Groundwater	  Use	  Permits	  
73.   Where the estimated annual volume of water taken from a well or collection of interlinked 
wells on a single land parcel is less than two acre-feet per annum and used only for domestic 
household purposes, the watermaster may issue a domestic groundwater use permit instead 
of a groundwater use permit and exempt the permit holder from annually accounting for the 
volume of water used. 
74.   All domestic groundwater use permits shall be consistent with 
•   This plan;  
•   Local permitting agency requirements; 
•   ABC County regulations; 
•   Department of Water Resources Bulletin 74-81 and 74-90 Water Well Standards; and 
•   State and federal regulations pertaining to water use and practices that might affect water 
quality. 
75.   To prevent increases in domestic household use from undermining the interests of other 
shareholders, every five years, the basin authority shall estimate the volume of water likely to 
be taken by these permit holders on an annual basis and require the relevant county and cities 
within each zone to maintain a water account with a balance sufficient to offset the estimated 
quarterly impact of domestic water users in each zone. The watermaster shall deduct this 
estimated amount from each domestic water use account, in arrears and on a quarterly basis. 
De	  Minimis	  Water	  Use	  Permits	  
76.   Where the estimated annual volume of water taken from a well or collection of interlinked 
wells on a single land parcel is less than one acre-foot per annum and the use is for a 
nondomestic purpose, the watermaster may issue a de minimis water use permit instead of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Historically,	  the	  state	  of	  California	  has	  authorized	  local	  permitting	  agencies	  (LPAs;	  usually	  the	  county,	  sometimes	  others)	  
to	  maintain	  these	  standards	  and	  other	  requirements	  dictated	  by	  the	  LPAs.	  The	  standards	  can	  be	  viewed	  at	  
http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/wells/standards.cfm.	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groundwater use permit and exempt the permit holder from annually accounting for the 
volume of water used. 
77.   All de minimis groundwater use permits shall be consistent with 
•   This plan; 
•   Local permitting agency requirements; 
•   ABC County regulations; 
•   Department of Water Resources Bulletin 74-81 and 74-90 Water Well Standards; and 
•   State and federal regulations pertaining to water use and practices that might affect water 
quality. 
78.   Unless the authority finds to the contrary, it shall be assumed that the total volume of 
groundwater extracted for de minimis purposes is negligible and that the costs of bring these 
uses into the sharing system would be greater than the benefits to shareholders that could be 
expected to result from the inclusion of de minimis uses. 
Community	  and	  Environmental	  Water	  Uses	  
79.   Any council or city may establish a community or environmental water project, have the 
project associated with a water account, and have the estimated quarterly volume of water 
used by this project deducted from this account in a manner similar to that used to account for 
the effects of domestic water users. 
Permit-­‐Issuing	  Process	  
80.   Before this plan comes into full effect, all land parcel owners with a well known to ABC 
County shall be issued a permit entitling them to take water from their wells in a manner 
consistent with this plan. 
81.   Applications for a new groundwater use permit shall be made to the watermaster and must be 
made before a well is constructed. 
82.   Applications shall include 
•   The APN of the parcel with which the well shall be linked; 
•   The GPS coordinates of the proposed well; 
•   The proposed maximum daily, monthly, and annual pumping rate of the well; and 
•   A commitment that will allow the volume of water taken from the well to be estimated. 
83.   All applications for a groundwater use permit must be lodged by or on behalf of the owners of 
the land parcel where a well is to be located. Whenever an application is received, the 
watermaster shall 
•   Publicly announce that the application has been received; 
•   Notify all adjacent land parcel owners of the nature of this application; 
•   Notify all the holders of all groundwater use permits likely to be affected by the 
application; and 
•   Give all interested third parties at least one month to object to the application. 
84.   If any objections to an application for a permit are received, the watermaster shall refer the 
matter to the basin authority for a decision as to whether or not to grant the permit and, if 
granted, the nature of the conditions to be attached to the permit. 
85.   If it deems appropriate, the basin authority or the watermaster acting on the basin authority’s 
behalf may refer the application to a court for resolution. 
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86.   Any permit shall expire two years after being issued if construction on a well has not been 
completed. 
87.   All groundwater use permits shall be publicly listed by the watermaster on the website of the 
basin authority. 
88.   Unless part of an arrangement is designed to incentivize improvements in groundwater 
quality, permits shall not be transferable. 
Water	  Use	  Accounts	  
Note: As a general rule, there are three ways to account for the volume of water used: (1) assuming 
that for each type of land use, a relatively constant amount of water is used, (2) metering the gross 
volume of water taken, and (3) estimating the net amount used by linking satellite-derived estimates of 
evapotranspiration with land parcel data. 
89.   Groundwater use in the ABC Basin shall be accounted for using net accounting practices. 
90.   Every groundwater use permit shall indicate how the volume of water that has been extracted 
from each well shall be turned into an estimate of the net amount of water that has been used. 
91.   If use is metered, then every five years the basin authority shall make a zonal estimate, by 
type of use, of the proportion of water that returns to the zone. The resultant proportion shall 
be known as a return-flow coefficient. As water is extracted from the well, the meter’s 
estimate of the volume extracted from the well shall be multiplied by the relevant coefficient 
and then deducted from the groundwater account associated with the well. 
92.   If use is assessed using satellite imagery and land parcel data, then the estimated net amount 
of water used shall be deducted from the relevant water account. The determination of the 
watermaster as to the net volume of groundwater used during each accounting period shall be 
final. 
Carryforward	  of	  Unused	  Allocations	  Allowed	  
93.   With adjustment for losses, any unused groundwater allocations in an account shall be carried 
forward from one allocation period to the next. 
94.   The use of unused groundwater allocations carried forward from one water accounting period 
to the next will be allowed even when water allocations per share are zero. 
95.   Any unused groundwater that has been carried forward is to be accounted for and managed in 
exactly the same manner as any other allocations made to a water account. 
96.   The basin authority shall, on a regular basis, make it clear to all shareholders that it is the 
basin authority’s responsibility to manage the groundwater resource and that water users are 
encouraged to plan for drought and sudden changes in water demand by carrying forward 
unused groundwater allocations from one water year to the next. 
Transfer	  of	  Allocations	  among	  Zones	  and	  out	  of	  the	  Basin	  
97.   The water accounting system used to track allocations shall permit the unfettered transfer of 
allocations within zones. 
98.   To facilitate the efficient aggregation of unused allocations and their transfer from one 
account to another, any legal entity may apply for and hold a zone-specific groundwater 
account that is not linked to any shares or any permit authorizing the extraction of water from 
a zone. 
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99.   Annex 3 contains rules for the transfer of water allocations between zones and may allow the 
transfer of allocations from a zone being managed under this plan to a zone being managed 
under another plan. 
100.   Annex 3 may contain rules that restrict the piping or pumping of groundwater allocations 
from one basin to another but may not prevent any arrangement that was in place on the date 
that this plan was approved from continuing. 
101.   The question of whether or not to allow the pumping and piped conveyance of water from one 
basin to another is distinct from the transfer of water allocations between two hydraulically 
linked basins; it is not a matter that the basin authority should determine. The question should 
be resolved by those entities responsible for approving construction of any pipeline needed to 
facilitate the pumping of water from one location to another. 
Groundwater	  Recharge	  and	  Augmentation	  
102.   Any landowner may apply for a groundwater recharge permit that allows them to 
artificially add to the volume of groundwater in one or more of a basin’s zones via managed 
infiltration or the direct injection of surface water. 
103.   A water purveyor may also apply for a groundwater recharge permit that gives the purveyor 
credit for surface water seepage from a ditch or channel into an aquifer. 
104.   Annex 3 shall contain a set of look-up tables to enable an objective estimate of the volume of 
water that has been added to an aquifer and, as a result, becomes available for use. 
105.   A groundwater recharge permit shall not be issued for any activity that is expected to return 
less than 50 acre-feet per annum. 
106.   Groundwater recharge permits that authorize recharge shall require the volume of all water 
returned to an aquifer to be estimated using an agreed-on methodology approved by the basin 
authority. 
107.   When and as recharge occurs, the watermaster shall credit the estimated volume to the water 
account associated with the permit and, thereafter, the resultant allocations shall be treated in 
exactly the same manner as all allocations.54 
Significant	  Interception	  of	  Groundwater	  
Note: In Australia and South Africa, water managers have found it necessary to control land-use 
practices that change the amount of water that can be pumped from an aquifer. In the southeast of 
South Australia, for example, a landowner who establishes a timber plantation over a shallow aquifer 
is required to account for the water extracted from the aquifer by these trees.55 
108.   Examples of potentially significant forms of interception include the establishment of a timber 
plantation over a shallow aquifer and the capture of overland flows that otherwise would have 
infiltrated naturally into an aquifer. 
109.   Where appropriate and where a recent change in land-use practice is deemed by the basin 
authority to be intercepting significant amounts of water that otherwise would have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Certain	  agencies,	  such	  as	  an	  irrigation	  district,	  may	  be	  recharging	  the	  basin	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  customers.	  In	  the	  first	  
instance,	  the	  water	  allocations	  would	  be	  credited	  to	  the	  water	  account	  associated	  with	  the	  land	  where	  the	  recharge	  
occurs.	  It	  would	  then	  be	  up	  to	  the	  owner	  of	  that	  account	  to	  determine	  how	  to	  distribute	  the	  resultant	  allocations.	  If	  the	  
land	  is	  owned	  or	  leased	  to	  the	  irrigation	  district,	  it	  first	  would	  be	  credited	  to	  its	  water	  account.	  It	  would	  then	  be	  up	  to	  the	  
district	  to	  determine	  how	  to	  distribute	  these	  allocations.	  
55	  For	  more	  information,	  see	  M.D.	  Young	  and	  J.C.	  McColl,	  “Double	  Trouble:	  The	  Importance	  of	  Accounting	  for	  and	  Defining	  
Water	  Entitlements	  Consistent	  with	  Hydrological	  Realities,”	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  Agricultural	  and	  Resource	  Economics	  
53(2008):19–35.	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available to shareholders, the basin authority shall notify all relevant stakeholders that it may 
be necessary to amend this plan and bring certain forms of water interception into the 
accounting system used to prevent undesirable results. 
110.   The basin authority may require a land parcel owner to offset the impact of a significant form 
of groundwater interception. Offsetting is to be achieved either by (1)  requiring the deduction 
of allocations from a water account equivalent to the estimated impact of the interception on 
other water users or (2) quarantining an appropriate number of shares from the annual 
allocation system so that, on average, the form of interception has no adverse effect on the 
expected number of allocations per share. 
Penalties	  for	  Unintentional	  Overuse	  
111.   If the balance of any water account becomes negative and the reason for this is unintentional, 
permit holders shall be given 30 days to either return the account to a positive balance or elect 
to cease pumping until the next year and have twice the deficit debited to the opening balance 
of their account for the following year. 
112.   If the holder of the account fails to elect to cease pumping or return the account to a 
nonnegative balance within 30 days, the watermaster shall 
•   Suspend the account holder’s groundwater use permit; 
•   Debit three times the deficit from the account holder’s opening balance for the following 
year; 
•   Notify all persons with a registered interest in the associated land parcel and all adjoining 
land parcel owners of the actions that have been taken; and 
•   If appropriate, arrange for the account holder to be penalized for breaching this plan. 
113.   A watermaster may lift the suspension when the account associated with it is returned to a 
nonnegative balance. 
114.   If a groundwater use permit remains suspended for more than two calendar years, the permit 
shall be canceled and the deficit written off as a loss to the basin as a whole. 
Intentional	  Overuse	  
115.   If a land parcel owner permits the water account to be overdrawn by more than 5% of the 
average volume of water applied to that parcel in the last five years or the basin authority 
judges the overuse to be intentional, the basin authority may either suspend a groundwater use 
permit for up to five years or cancel the permit. 
Announcement	  and	  Issuance	  of	  Allocations	  
Note: It is important that all stakeholders, including those who have yet to secure shares or an 
allocation, are given equal opportunity to profit from the purchase and sale of water allocations and 
shares. 
116.   Groundwater that is regulated under this plan shall be allocated by water year. Each water 
year shall commence on October 1 of one year and end on September 30 of the following 
year. 
117.   On the first working day after September 1 of each year at 10:00 a.m., the basin authority 
chair shall announce the volume of water to be assigned to each share so that the watermaster 
can credit this amount to the water accounts associated with each share at 9:00 a.m. on 
October 1. 
118.   The board may make additional allocations during a year in a manner that is consistent with 
the annual allocation framework set out in Annex 1. 
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119.   Any or all unused annual allocations recorded in a water account may be transferred to any 
other water account in the same management area or with adjustment for losses and time 
delays from one region to another. 
120.   The watermaster shall keep the information contained in any nonnegative water account 
confidential. The watermaster may reveal the name of the owner or owners of any water 
account that is in a negative balance. 
121.   The watermaster shall regularly make aggregated information about the rate of water use in 
each region and the basin as a whole publicly available. 
122.   On the first day that this plan comes into full effect, the basin authority may (1) instruct the 
watermaster to make an additional buffer allocation to all shareholders in any manner that is 
consistent with this plan and (2) set aside a reserve amount of water to be allocated to the 
owners of land reliant on access to a surface water resource if a severe drought occurs during 
any of the first 10 years after this plan comes into full effect. 
Share	  Register	  
123.   The State Water Resources Control Board shall establish a share register for the ABC 
Groundwater Basin and establish efficient ways to allow negotiated changes to be made to 
this share register. This register shall be accessible by any member of the public over the 
Internet. 
124.   The State Water Resources Control Board shall guarantee and maintain the integrity of the 
share register. 
125.   Amendments to the ABC Basin Share Register may be made only by persons authorized by 
the State Water Resources Control Board to amend this register. 
Recording	  Financial	  and	  Other	  Interests	  
126.   When requested to do so, the watermaster shall record any financial, mortgage, or other 
interest over shares held in a common interest in the share register. When instructed by a 
court, the basin authority watermaster shall record an encumbrance over a shareholding. All 
legal entities with a registered interest in a land parcel shall be notified of the fact that shares 
in the ABC Basin will soon be issued and that this may affect the value of the land presently 
associated with these shares. 
Share	  Transfer	  Process	  
127.   When a shareholder, with the consent of all registered financial or other interests, applies for a 
change of ownership, the watermaster shall authorize that the change be made to the water 
register in the manner requested by the shareholder and approved by all registered and other 
interests in the share. 
128.   Appropriate identity checks will be used to minimize the risk of a fraudulent transfer. All 
parties named on an existing share and all registered interests must approve a transfer. 
129.   The watermaster may not refuse to transfer shares to a third party on the grounds that a 
groundwater use permit normally associated with a portfolio of shares has been suspended. 
Restrictions	  on	  Share	  Transfers	  
Note: This section has been included in this roadmap because some people involved in its 
development considered that speculation should be prevented. International experience would suggest 
that the local benefits of allowing anyone to invest in shares, typically, are greater than the costs. The 
transfer of water out of district, however, is a different consideration and most efficiently managed via 
restrictions on the transfer of allocations out of a basin. In an unbundled sharing system, it is possible 
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to allow money to come in but not allow water to flow out of the district. It is recommended that 
restrictions on share ownership not be included in any basin groundwater sustainability plan. 
130.   During the first 10 years of this plan, no more than 10% of the shares in each zone may be 
transferred to or held by a legal entity who does not own land in the ABC Basin or who was 
not a landowner in the XYZ Basin when this plan was approved. 
Protection	  of	  Existing	  Water	  Rights	  
131.   Any legal entity that accepts shares or a water use permit issued as a result of the adoption of 
this plan shall be defined as having fully met any reasonable and beneficial use conditions 
associated with any right to extract or use ABC Basin Groundwater on January 1, 2015, and 
all actions after this date that otherwise would have been necessary to retain that right. 
Initial	  Share	  Allocation	  
Note: The next clause is written with a view to stop people from pumping to obtain shares. There is no 
SGMA requirement for the suggested date. The data collected and assessed to be used for initial share 
allocations should come from a time period determined by the authority. A suggestion of five years 
into the past is used here, but this is certainly amendable. 
The question of who is eligible to initially receive shares is very important and should not be taken 
lightly. In this roadmap, all potential users are included in the process.56 
132.   Consistent with the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, from January 1, 2015, access 
to the ABC Groundwater Basin shall be considered closed. That is, the basin authority may 
determine that shares will be issued in a manner that only takes into account the nature of 
groundwater use and associated investment made before January 1, 2015, or such other date 
as the basin authority determines. 
133.   Under this plan, the share allocation process shall involve six steps: 
(1)   Determining eligibility. Determining who is eligible to be included in the share allocation 
process. 
(2)   Designing the allocation database. Determining the full range of data to be collected and 
considered during the share allocation process.  
(3)   Assembling and validating the database. Collecting the necessary data and validating its 
content.  
(4)    Developing and finalizing a formula. With due process and engagement, determining the 
most appropriate formula or formulas to determine how many shares each eligible entity 
should receive in a manner that is seen to be fair and then choosing the most appropriate 
formula to use.  
(5)   Building the share register. Combining the data in the database with the selected 
allocation formula to build the register and then inviting all who think they should have 
received shares to check the accuracy of this register and, if they find any error or omission, 
request that it be corrected.  
(6)   Confirming the accuracy of the share register. This step makes it impossible for any 
further changes to be made to the register because of an error or an omission.  
Step	  1.	  Determining	  Eligibility	  to	  Receive	  a	  Share	  Allocation	  
134.   Prior to the issue of shares to landowners in a zone, the watermaster, in consultation with the 
State Water Resources Control Board, the ABC County, and relevant cities shall (1) make 
efforts through public notices, newspaper advertisements, and community outreach to ensure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  There	  is	  considerable	  controversy	  around	  this	  provision.	  It	  is	  included	  here	  so	  that	  readers	  can	  see	  one	  way	  of	  dealing	  
fairly	  with	  land	  parcel	  owners	  who	  have	  made	  post-­‐SGMA	  investments.	  Readers	  are	  advised	  to	  read	  the	  narratives	  
contained	  in	  the	  body	  of	  this	  report	  for	  a	  better	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  of	  the	  steps	  in	  the	  suggested	  process.	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that all legal entities with an interest in the ABC Groundwater Basin are aware that a six-step 
share allocation process is about to commence, and (2) send a registered letter to all land 
parcel holders in the basin informing them that the basin authority has begun building the 
databases necessary to enable them to issue shares and groundwater use permits. 
135.   Shares may be issued only to the owners of land parcels, their assigns and successors, or both 
who are located within a zone identified in Annex 2 and associated with land that has an 
assessor’s parcel number in the ABC County Land Register. 
136.   It shall be the responsibility of the owners of each land parcel to ensure that the ABC County 
Land Register is correct. 
137.   It shall be the responsibility of each land parcel owner to ensure that the ABC County well-
permitting system includes a permit for any groundwater well in the ABC Basin. 
Step	  2.	  Designing	  the	  Database	  to	  Be	  Used	  for	  Share	  Allocation	  
138.   The basin authority shall involve the water users from each zone and the local community 
associated with the zone in the processes used to determine the share allocation formula and 
make them aware of the fact that they are in the process of building the database to be used to 
allocate shares. 
139.   Within each zone and in addition to ownership and parcel area, the database shall classify 
land parcels as to whether or not they have a valid well permit and if, over the last five years, 
the land was used for one or more of the following purposes:  
•   Dryland production, recreation, or conservation uses; 
•   Municipal and industrial water provision; 
•   Irrigated agriculture that is reliant on surface water only, on surface and groundwater, 
and on groundwater only. 
 
140.   Industrial, commercial, recreational, amenity, or conservation activities reliant on their own 
water supply and considered in at least one year likely to have taken more than two acre-feet 
or less than two acre-feet. 
141.   Domestic household uses reliant on their own groundwater supply and in at least one year 
considered likely to have taken more than two acre-feet or less than two acre-feet. 
142.   De minimis uses, such as wells used to supply water to livestock, that are estimated to be 
taking less than one acre-foot per annum. The database may recognize more than one type of 
water use on the same land parcel. For example, a land parcel may be used for growing grapes 
and contain a winery that uses significant amounts of groundwater. Land use changes made 
after [date] shall not be recognized. 
143.   For irrigated agriculture, the database shall include  
•   The types of land use occurring on a parcel so that an independent estimate of the amount 
of water needed to efficiently produce a crop may be made;  
•   The value of any groundwater- and surface water–related fees paid to an agency over the 
last five years; 
•   The estimated proportion of the parcel that is irrigable;  
•   An independent estimate of the amount of groundwater required to efficiently and cost-
effectively use the land for its nominated purpose;57  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  A	  number	  of	  universities	  periodically	  publish	  independent	  estimates	  of	  the	  volume	  of	  water	  needed	  to	  grow	  a	  crop	  to	  
maturity	  in	  different	  locations.	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•   The proportion of the required volume of water that is likely to have been sourced from 
the basin; 
•   Any independently verifiable data on the volume of water extracted from a ground or 
surface water source during each of the last five years; 
•   The average age of any permanent plantings on the land parcel; and 
•   Any other measurable factors identified during a community consultation process. 
 
144.   For industrial and commercial water users, such as a winery or a military base, the 
database shall include  
•   The value of any groundwater- and surface water–related fees paid to an agency over the 
last five years;  
•   If possible, a verifiable or independent estimate of the volume of groundwater used in 
each of the last five years;  
•   The quantity and value of products sold in any or all of the last five years as confirmed 
by an income or state sales tax return;  
•   The average amount of water likely to be used by an efficient water user for each type of 
product sold; and  
•   The water use efficiency of the equipment being used on the land. 
 
145.   For municipal water supplies provided by water corporations, mutual water companies, and 
small community water supply systems, the database shall include  
•   The volume of groundwater extracted from each zone in each of the last five years;  
•   The number of households and businesses supplied;  
•   An independent estimate of the average annual amount of water each household and 
business can reasonably be expected to use;  
•   The area of parks and gardens watered by groundwater and the amount these features can 
reasonably be expected to use in an average year. 
 
146.   For domestic and de minimis groundwater uses, the database shall include an estimate of 
the average annual amount of groundwater used by each parcel with accounting for the 
proportion that is likely to return, following use, back to the zone from which it is taken and 
an estimate of the proportion of water used within and outside the buildings located on the 
parcel. 
Step	  3.	  Assembling	  and	  Validating	  the	  Database	  to	  Be	  Used	  for	  Share	  Allocation	  Purposes	  
147.   As soon as the database has been built, all parcel owners shall be informed of the information 
that has been associated with their land parcels and given at least one month to notify the 
watermaster of any amendments that they believe should be made to their entry or all similar 
entries. 
148.   The authority shall be the arbitrator of which requests for amendment to the database should 
be accepted. 
Step	  4.	  Determining	  the	  Formula	  to	  Be	  Used	  to	  Allocate	  Shares	  
149.   It shall be the responsibility of the basin authority, in consultation with the ABC Groundwater 
Basin Agency and engagement with all stakeholders, to decide on the formula to be used to 
calculate the number of shares to be issued to eligible landowners. 
150.   The basin authority may appoint an independent share allocation panel to consult with 
relevant stakeholders and recommend the most appropriate share allocation formula or 
formulas to be used in each zone. If it is decided to appoint such a panel, its members shall 
	  63	  
consist of a retired judge or experienced water lawyer, an economist, a sociologist, and an 
irrigator or experienced member of a mutual water company without any direct interest or 
connection to the basin. 
151.   As a basis for discussion, it is suggested that the formula chosen initially should cause 
minimal disruption to existing land-use arrangements and that discussions begin by 
recognizing that this plan 
•   Grants each shareholder an additional 20% allocation so that users have a buffer to assist 
them to transition into this basin groundwater sharing system; 
•   Limits the rate by which the basin authority may reduce water allocations per share; 
•   Allows the carryover of unused water from year to year and provides that these 
allocations may not be taken from a water account holder even if there is a severe 
drought; and 
•   Provides low-cost opportunities for water users to transfer allocations from one account 
to another. 
152.   Recognizing these considerations and the fact that protracted negotiations are expensive, 
unless the basin authority determines otherwise, the share allocation formula shall 
•   Estimate the maximum annual volume of groundwater used over the last five years in 
each zone that each eligible shareholder has used; 
•   Allocate shares in proportion to the estimated maximum amount of water that each 
shareholder has used in the last five years; 
•   Allocate shares so that each can be described initially as an entitlement to receive in the 
vicinity of one acre-inch of groundwater per annum;58 and 
•   With the exception of shares held by a county or city, for each of the first 10 years of this 
plan, transfer 1% of each shareholder’s shares to a pool for redistribution to land parcel 
owners with more than one acre of land not used for a domestic purpose. 
Step	  5.	  Establishing	  the	  Share	  Register	  
153.   Under direction from the basin authority, the watermaster shall build the ABC Groundwater 
Basin Share Register in a manner consistent with this plan and the share allocation formula 
adopted by the authority.59 
154.   At the time when any shares are issued, any registered interest recorded on a land parcel shall 
be transferred to the shares initially associated with that land parcel. 
155.   Before January 1, 2019, where appropriate and with the basin authority’s prior approval, the 
watermaster may amend any shareholding or issue additional shares so as to correct any errors 
or omissions found in the database. 
Step	  6.	  Confirming	  the	  Share	  Register’s	  Accuracy	  
156.   In the understanding that the data used to build the share register may contain errors or 
omissions, share allocations made in 2017 shall be provisional and confirmed as final on 
January 1, 2019. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  In	  some	  zones,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  issue	  10	  shares	  per	  acre-­‐foot	  so	  that	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  there	  will	  ever	  be	  a	  
need	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  shares	  on	  issues.	  
59	  An	  alternative	  arrangement	  is	  to	  split	  shares	  into	  two	  classes,	  a	  permanent	  and	  a	  transitionary	  shareholding,	  and	  then	  
phase	  out	  allocations	  to	  transitionary	  shares	  over,	  say,	  a	  10-­‐year	  period.	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Issuing	  Groundwater	  Use	  Permits	  and	  Associating	  Them	  with	  Water	  Accounts	  
157.   The authority shall issue a groundwater use permit to the owner of every land parcel with a 
valid XYZ County well permit that is expected to continue to use water for nondomestic or 
non–de minimis purposes. 
158.   The authority shall issue a domestic groundwater use permit to the owner of every land parcel 
with a valid XYZ County well permit that is expected to continue to extract water only for 
domestic purposes. 
159.   The authority shall issue a de minimis groundwater use permit to the owner of every land 
parcel with a valid XYZ County well permit that is expected to continue to extract water only 
for de minimis purposes. 
160.   No one other than the owner(s) of a land parcel may apply for or be granted a groundwater 
use permit, a domestic groundwater use permit, or a de minimis water use permit. 
161.   Every groundwater use permit shall always be linked to a groundwater account and, at all 
times, this account kept in a nonnegative balance. 
162.   The master copy of all permits shall be kept by the watermaster in an electronic register that is 
publicly accessible and may be amended by the watermaster in any manner consistent with 
this plan. 
Basin	  Boundary	  and	  Zone	  Boundary	  Modification	  
Modification	  of	  the	  Basin	  Area	  
163.   When the basin authority wishes to bring a new area of land into the basin, it shall first amend 
this plan using the plan amendment processes set out in this plan. 
164.   When two adjoining basin authorities wish either to amalgamate part or all of a groundwater 
resource, this shall be achieved by announcing the intent to transfer zones from one plan to 
another, making appropriate amendments to each plan and then transferring the relevant 
shares from one basin to another. 
165.   When bringing land into a basin that is not inside a region under a plan similar to this one, the 
basin authority shall issue shares to all landowners in the region using the procedures and, to 
the extent possible, the formulas used to issue shares when this plan was first finalized. 
166.   When bringing new land into the basin or retiring land from a basin, the board shall do so in a 
manner that does not reduce the interests of any existing shareholder. 
Zone	  Boundary	  Realignment	  
167.   The basin authority may realign one or more zone boundaries by amending this plan. 
Whenever a zone boundary is realigned, the basin authority shall act in a manner that can be 
expected to preserve the interests of all shareholders. 
168.   During the process of zone realignment, all shareholders in the zone or zones that are to be 
reduced in size shall be offered the opportunity to surrender their shares on the understanding 
that they be offered shares in a larger zone. When this process occurs, the opportunity to 
convert shares shall be offered first to the owners of land in the area being moved from one 
zone to another. 
169.   When realigning zone boundaries brings new land into the basin, the board shall do so in a 
manner that does not reduce the interests of any existing shareholders. 
170.   When transferring shares from one zone to another as part of a boundary realignment process, 
the watermaster must give any registered interests recorded on those shares one month’s 
notice that these shares are to be transferred from one zone to another as part of a boundary 
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realignment and then do so only in a manner that does not diminish the value of the registered 
interest. 
171.   Shares may not be transferred from one zone or basin to another unless the transfer is part of a 
boundary modification process. 
No	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Basin	  Authority	  or	  One	  or	  More	  of	  Its	  Members	  
Note: This section of the plan is drafted to ensure that, in the unlikely event that a majority of basin 
authority members are dismissed, the watermaster and all the processes relating to the making of 
water allocations and accounting for use continue to function. 
172.   Basin authority members may be dismissed if their performance is found unsatisfactory by 
any one or more of  
•   The Department of Water Resources;  
•   A 60% majority of the members of the ABC Basin Groundwater Sustainability 
Agency;  
•   60% of ABC Basin shareholders by number;  
•   Shareholders holding more than 70% of shares in the basin as defined by this 
Groundwater Sustainability Plan. 
 
173.   If, as a result of a dismissal, fewer than three appointed basin authority members remain, the 
State Water Resources Control Board shall appoint a basin administrator to take over all the 
basin authority’s functions until the dismissed members can be replaced. 
Appointment	  of	  a	  Basin	  Administrator	  
174.   If the basin authority is replaced by an administrator, that person shall have all the 
responsibilities and regulatory powers of the basin authority including its power to appoint or 
dismiss the ABC Basin Watermaster. 
175.   The basin authority or a basin administrator are the only entities that can dismiss a 
watermaster. 
176.   When an administrator is appointed, that person shall work with the ABC Groundwater Basin 
Sustainability Agency to appoint a new basin authority with a view to ensuring that members 
of this basin authority can take over responsibility for the management of this plan within six 
months. 
Suspension	  of	  Plan	  during	  Nondrought	  States	  of	  Emergency	  
177.   When the governor of California proclaims a state of emergency or local emergency, the 
Department of Water Resources may approve suspension of this plan provided that the reason 
for the state of emergency is not a drought. In the case that a state of emergency is associated 
with a drought, this plan may not be suspended. 
Fees	  and	  Charges	  
178.   The basin authority shall recover the costs of the services it provides to the ABC Basin 
through a range of fees and charges. 
179.   Annex 4 contains a schedule of fees and charges to be collected by the basin authority. 
Legal	  Status	  and	  Commencement	  
Summary	  of	  Engagement	  Process	  Used	  during	  Development	  of	  this	  Plan	  
180.   A draft of this plan was circulated to people likely to receive shares under this plan on [date] 
and public meetings held to discuss it on [date] and [date]. 
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ABC	  Groundwater	  Sustainability	  Agency	  Resolutions	  
181.   On [date] the ABC Groundwater Sustainability Agency resolved that 
(1)   This ABC Groundwater Basin Plan offers the most appropriate way to achieve the objectives 
and sustainability goal set for this basin and puts in place all the administrative and regulatory 
arrangements necessary to ensure that the significant and unreasonable results identified in 
this plan can be avoided. 
(2)   The Department of Water Resources approves this groundwater sustainability plan for the 
ABC Groundwater Basin so that arrangements can be put in place to bring this plan into full 
effect. 
(3)   The Department of Water Resources confirms that this plan is sufficient to serve as the ABC 
Basin’s Groundwater Sustainability Plan. 
________________________________, Chair 
________________________________, Member 
________________________________, Member 
________________________________, Member 
________________________________, Member 
________________________________, Member 
________________________________ Date 
Approval	  and	  Acceptance	  of	  Plan	  for	  the	  Management	  and	  Administration	  of	  the	  ABC	  
Groundwater	  Basin	  
182.   Pursuant to the powers granted to the Department of Water Resources via §10723.8, the 
arrangements set out in this plan shall come into effect on January 1, 2017, on the 
understanding that an ABC Basin Authority will be established and a watermaster appointed 
in a timely manner and that all efforts will be made to bring this groundwater sustainability 
plan into effect on the commencement of the water year starting on October 1, 2018. 
 
 
 
________________________________  
for California Department of Water Resources  
 
________________________________ Date 
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Annex	  1.	  ABC	  Basin	  Groundwater	  Annual	  Allocation	  Framework	  
183.   The basin authority may make allocation decisions only in a manner consistent with this 
annex. 
Relationship	  among	  Goals,	  Policy	  Instruments,	  and	  Management	  Actions	  
184.   This plan establishes six objectives and one principal sustainability goal. One or more policy 
instruments and management actions are needed to enable the efficient attainment of each 
goal. 
185.   The objectives relating to the undesirable results of depletion, stock reduction, subsidence, 
and adverse effects on surface water will be achieved by 
186.   Setting maximum average, preferred maximum, and absolute maximum depths to 
groundwater; 
•   Determining the maximum net amount of groundwater that may be withdrawn from each 
zone and triggering actions that must occur when this maximum is reached; 
•   Every year determining the maximum amount of water in each zone that may be 
assigned to shareholders for use and making this amount available to shareholders from 
the commencement of each water year; and 
•   Putting in place a robust water-accounting and use-permitting system. 
187.   The objectives relating to the undesirable results of significant and unreasonable seawater 
intrusion and degradation of water quality and plume management, in addition to setting the 
maximum net amount of water that may be withdrawn, will be achieved by setting zone 
boundaries so as to enable the efficient control of undesirable results that are location specific 
and placing limits on the rate and volume of water that may be taken from locations where 
there is a significant risk of seawater intrusion or where a plume exists. 
188.   The objectives relating to social, economic, and community development shall be achieved by 
•   Unbundling the regulatory system so that efforts to make best use of water are 
incentivized and the costs of reallocation kept as low as possible; 
•   Establishing robust, publicly accessible share registers and making it possible to transfer 
shares at low cost; 
•   Enabling financiers and others with an interest in a share to record that interest in the 
register and prevent the transfer of the share until that interest is cleared; 
•   Establishing a robust water accounting system that maximizes opportunities to adjust 
quickly to changing water supply and demand conditions; and 
•   Setting exchange rates that permit the transfer of allocations between zones. 
189.   The objectives relating to domestic water use shall be achieved by  
•   Implementing administrative arrangements that prevent undesired outcomes, thereby 
reducing the likelihood that water use will have significant undesirable impacts on 
opportunities for households and disadvantaged communities to access and use water, 
and  
•   Allowing any household to take up to two acre-feet of groundwater per annum from the 
ABC Basin on the understanding that the impact of this use will be offset by an 
arrangement that requires ABC County to hold and maintain a water account from which 
the estimated volume of water used by domestic water users will be deducted on a 
quarterly basis.  
190.   The sustainability goal shall be achieved in each zone by  
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•   Setting a maximum average depth to groundwater above which the basin authority 
should attempt to maintain the water table and not allow each zone to pass below; 
•   Setting a preferred average maximum depth to groundwater that should not be passed; 
•   Setting an absolute maximum depth to groundwater below which the depth will not be 
allowed to descend; 
•   Requiring the basin authority to reduce annual allocations per share by at least 10% per 
annum whenever the average depth drops below the maximum average depth to 
groundwater or the preferred average maximum depth to groundwater; 
•   Requiring the basin authority, when the average water level in a zone drops below the 
absolute maximum depth to groundwater, to set allocations per share to zero with the 
exception of (1) domestic users who in such circumstances shall be allowed to continue 
to take not more than 0.5 acre-feet per annum and (2) de minimis users located on 
irrigated land and not able to access surface water; 
•   Requiring the basin authority, when making decisions on the amount of water that may 
be allocated to shareholders in each zone, to take account of the volume of allocation 
trades that it has allowed to occur from one zone to another and, hence, the need to 
shepherd groundwater from one zone to another. 
Monitoring	  and	  Reporting	  Progress	  toward	  Sustainability	  Goals	  
191.   Every year, the basin authority shall monitor progress made toward each of the goals and 
release a report showing changes or otherwise. In particular, the basin authority shall establish 
at least four monitoring wells in each zone and shall provide an annual report on (1) the 
average depth to the water table in each zone, (2) the groundwater salinity in all zones 
adjacent to the coast, (3) the extent of land subsidence, and (4) the movement of any known 
plumes. 
192.   In recognition of the importance of pursuing social and economic goals as well as 
environmental goals, the basin authority shall include in its annual report a summary of  
•   The total economic value of the water in each zone as indicated by the number of zone 
shares on issue multiplied by the annual mean price of share transfers between 
independent entities; 
•   The nature and value of allocations in water accounts; 
•   The volume of allocations carried forward; 
•   The volume of water allocations and number of water use permit holders who at the end 
of the year had either elected to or been forced to borrow from next year’s water 
allocation; 
•   The number of permits that were suspended at the end of the year or canceled during the 
year; and 
•   Its prediction of the rate by which allocations per year will need to be reduced to bring 
the use of groundwater in each zone to achieve this plan’s sustainability goal. 
193.   The annual report shall be made public and submitted to the Department of Water Resources 
no later than the end of the first week of February of each year. 
Interim	  Milestones	  
194.   The basin authority shall set interim milestones so as to enable all water users to plan with 
confidence. To this end, 
•   Every five years, the basin authority shall set an upper limit to the amount by which it 
may reduce annual allocations per share; 
•   Each shareholder, in addition to the first year’s allocation, shall be issued an initial buffer 
allocation equivalent to 20% of the first year’s allocation; 
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•   In the first year, the total amount of water allocated to all shareholders in each zone shall 
not be less than 98.5% of the volume of water estimated to have been used in the last 
water year before this plan came into full effect; 
•   In the second year, allocations per share shall not be reduced by more than 1.5% per 
annum; 
•   In subsequent years, whenever the average depth to groundwater declines, the basin 
authority shall be required to reduce allocations per share by at least 1.5%. 
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Annex	  2.	  The	  ABC	  Groundwater	  Basin	  and	  Zones	  
195.   The map below delineates the boundaries of the ABC Groundwater Basin under the 
jurisdiction of the ABC Groundwater Sustainability Agency and the zones to be used for 
groundwater management and water accounting purposes. 
Note: Insert an appropriate map here. 
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Annex	  3.	  Accounting	  Arrangements	  for	  the	  Transfer	  of	  Water	  Allocations	  among	  Zones,	  Aquifer	  
Recharge,	  and	  Aquifer	  Augmentation	  
Note: This annex needs to be basin specific and in some cases project specific. It sets up the exchange 
rates to be used for the transfer of groundwater allocations from one zone to another and between 
connected basins. Where appropriate, the transfer of allocations from one zone to another may 
involve a time delay. 
Trading	  Allocations	  within	  a	  Zone	  
196.   The basin authority shall only allow the transfer of water from one zone to another in a 
manner that neither disadvantages nor favors any other water users. 
197.   The trade of groundwater allocations within a zone in a confined aquifer is to be on a one-for-
one basis. The trade of groundwater allocations within a fractured aquifer shall be on a case-
by-case basis and in accordance with guidelines approved by the basin authority. 
Trading	  Allocations	  between	  Zones	  
198.   The basin authority must attempt to estimate the likely impacts that interzone trading can be 
expected to have on the depth to groundwater in each zone and set a limit on the maximum 
volume of water that may be transferred from one zone to another. 
199.   The conversion or exchange rate for the transfer of unused groundwater allocations and the 
maximum volume that may be transferred per year shall be published on the basin authority’s 
website and be publicly accessible. The table used to define the exchange rates to be used 
shall take the form of the table set out below. 
200.   Transfers shall be made on a first come, first served priority basis. Multiyear approvals may 
be granted on the condition that the watermaster is authorized to and does make them on the 
first day of a water year. 
201.   To protect the interests of all shareholders and, in particular, to prevent a rush to take 
advantage of a sudden change in conditions, the basin authority may suspend interzone 
trading if, in its opinion, further transfer of allocations from one zone to another would have 
an adverse effect on the interests of other shareholders. 
202.   On the day that this plan comes fully into effect, the exchange rate for moving water 
allocations from one zone to another shall be as shown in Table A3.1.  
Table	  A2.1.	  Sample	  exchange	  rate	  for	  moving	  water	  allocations	  
Source	   Target	  
Zone	  1	   Zone	  2	   Zone	  3	   Zone	  4	  
Zone	  1	   1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.0	  
Zone	  2	   0.9	   1	   0.0	   0.0	  
Zone	  3	   0.0	   0.85	   1	   0.0	  
Zone	  4	   0.0	   0.6	   0	   1	  
 
On the day that this plan comes fully into effect, during any water year the maximum volume of 
allocations that may be transferred from one zone to another shall be as shown in Table A3.2.  
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Table	  A3.2.	  Sample	  maximum	  volume	  of	  allocations	  
Source	   Target	  
Zone	  1	   Zone	  2	   Zone	  3	   Zone	  4	  
Zone	  1	   No	  limit	   0.0	   0.0	   0.0	  
Zone	  2	   200	   No	  limit	   0.0	   0.0	  
Zone	  3	   0.0	   300	   No	  limit	   0.0	  
Zone	  4	   0.0	   50	   0.0	   No	  limit	  
 
203.   The basin authority may not retrospectively modify an exchange rate or revise the maximum 
volume of allocations that may be transferred from one zone to another in any water year. 
Aquifer	  Recharge	  and	  Augmentation	  
204.   The basin authority may, on a project-by-project basis, authorize the watermaster to 
periodically credit the recharge or augmentation of an aquifer at the rates shown in Table 
A3.3. 
Table	  A3.3.	  Percentage	  of	  metered	  volume	  of	  water	  to	  be	  credited	  to	  relevant	  water	  account,	  by	  project	  
Project	  No.	   Percentage	  of	  water	  
1	   Y1%	  
2	   Y2%	  
~	   ~	  
n	   Yn%	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Annex	  4.	  Fees	  and	  Charges	  
205.   The charges set out below may be modified by the basin authority on an annual basis. 
206.   No charges shall be set for the initial establishment of water accounts and the issuing of 
shares at the commencement of this groundwater sustainability plan. 
Table	  A4.1.	  Share	  register	  charges	  
Action	   $	  per	  
Confirm	  the	  ownership	  of	  a	  share	  and	  the	  registered	  interests	  
associated	  with	  it	  
Shareholding	  held	  in	  
a	  common	  interest	  
Registration	  of	  a	  financial	  interest	   Registration	  
Removal	  of	  a	  registered	  financial	  interest	   Registration	  
Change	  in	  ownership	  in	  a	  shareholding	  with	  no	  registered	  financial	  
interest	  and	  not	  involving	  the	  management	  of	  the	  transfer	  of	  money	  
Change	  in	  ownership	  
Change	  in	  ownership	  in	  part	  or	  all	  of	  a	  shareholding	  with	  a	  registered	  
financial	  interest	  or	  confirmation	  of	  parties	  that	  they	  have	  received	  
appropriate	  payments	  
Change	  in	  ownership	  
Registration	  of	  a	  lease	  for	  a	  limited	  period	  of	  time	   Registration	  
Change	  in	  the	  water	  account	  associated	  with	  a	  shareholding	   Change	  
Subdivision	  of	  a	  shareholding	  involving	  a	  financial	  interest	   Subdivision	  
Change	  to	  the	  water	  account	  linked	  to	  one	  or	  more	  shares	  in	  the	  
register	  
Change	  in	  water	  
account	  
 
Table	  A4.2.	  Annual	  water	  resource	  management	  charges	  
Charge	   $	  per	  
Fixed	  annual	  water	  resource	  
access	  	  
Share	  
Resource	  use	  monitoring	  	   Well	  
Water	  use	  accounting	  and	  
monitoring	  	  
Acre-­‐feet	  allocated	  to	  each	  
shareholding	  
	  
Table	  A4.3.	  Water	  account	  charges	  
Action	   $	  per	  
Establishment	  of	  a	  water	  account	   $0	  
Annual	  charge	  for	  maintenance	  of	  water	  account	  (all	  landholdings	  
with	  a	  groundwater	  use	  permit	  must	  hold	  a	  water	  account)	  
Account	  
Manual	  transfer	  of	  water	  from	  one	  account	  to	  another	   Transfer	  
Cancelation	  of	  a	  water	  account	   $0	  
	  
Table	  A4.4.	  Groundwater	  use	  permit	  charges	  
Action	   $	  per	  
Application	  for	  a	  permit	   Application	  
Amendment	  of	  a	  permit	  requested	  by	  user	   Amendment	  
Cancelation	  of	  a	  use	  approval	   Cancelation	  
Amendment	  of	  use	  approval	  so	  as	  to	  retain	  consistency	  
with	  this	  plan	  and	  related	  land-­‐	  and	  water-­‐use	  controls	  
Cancelation	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ANNEX	  5.	  Glossary	  of	  Terms	  
Note: This glossary is an early working draft. More work is needed on its content. 
absolute maximum depth to groundwater: The threshold depth to groundwater at which all 
allocations to shareholders in a zone must cease. 
allocation: A volume of water credited to a water account and made available for extraction, transfer 
to another water account, and carryforward to subsequent water years with adjustment for 
hydrological losses. 
basin administrator: An individual appointed to take over the functions, powers, and responsibilities 
of the basin authority. 
basin authority: A five-member body responsible for the scheduled achievement of the plan’s 
objectives, implementation, and amendment. 
basin share register: The only place where a person may go to find out who is the legal owner of 
each and every share in a zone and what fiduciary interests in a share exist. 
de minimis groundwater use permit: A permit authorizing the registered owner of a land parcel to 
extract water from a well or a group of wells for livestock and other purposes at a rate of less than one 
acre-foot per year. 
domestic groundwater use permit: A permit that authorizes the owner of a land parcel to extract and 
use groundwater from an approved well or group of wells for cooking, cleaning, hygiene, and 
reasonable outdoor watering purposes at a rate of less than two acre-feet per annum. 
exchange rate: A conversion rate set by the basin authority to be used when transferring groundwater 
allocations from one zone to another. 
groundwater recharge permit: A permit authorizing the artificial recharge of an aquifer and the 
crediting of the volume of water returned to a nominated water account. 
groundwater use permit: A permit setting out the conditions that owners of land parcels must 
comply with when extracting or authorizing one of their nominees to extract water from a well or a 
group of wells colocated on the land parcel. 
independent share allocation panel: An independent group of people appointed by the basin 
authority to manage the processes necessary for a basin authority to identify the most appropriate 
formula to use when allocating shares. 
land parcel: A delineated area of land associated with an assessor’s parcel number. 
landholder: The named owner or owners of one or more land parcels. 
maximum average depth to groundwater: An average depth to groundwater in a zone that the basin 
authority should seek to keep water levels above. 
preferred maximum depth to groundwater: The depth to groundwater that, if reached, can trigger a 
significant reduction in allocations to each shareholder. 
return-flow coefficient: The determined proportion of water applied to a land surface that returns to 
the basin area through infiltration in a specified zone. 
share: A perpetual or ongoing entitlement to a share of all allocations made by a basin authority to a 
zone. Each share is numbered and is associated with a water account to which all allocations are 
made. 
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shareholder: The named owner of a share or group of shares in a basin share register. A shareholder 
is, by necessity, given a water account to which annual allocations of water per share are made. 
sustainability goal: The objective of bringing the water budget or net withdrawals, inflows, and 
outflows of the basin into balance by a specified date. 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act: A three-bill package (AB 1739, SB 1319, and SB 
1168) signed into California state law in 2014. 
water use account: An account of guaranteed integrity that records the number of allocations that are 
held by the account owner and how any allocations credited to the account have been used, carried 
forward, or transferred to another account. Accounts may be linked to a shareholding or a 
groundwater use permit. They may also be held at arm’s length from any shareholding or permit. 
water year: A year-long period during which allocations made to water accounts at the beginning of 
that period maybe be used in full. When transitioning from one water year to the next, allocations 
remaining in water accounts from the previous year may be carried over into the next with 
adjustments for losses. 
watermaster: A nonvoting, ex officio member of a basin authority who may be appointed or 
dismissed by the basin authority or administrator. 
zone: A delineated part of a basin for which the basin authority shall announce the aggregate amount 
of water to allocate to shareholders in a management area and then, to the extent hydrologically 
possible, allow the 1:1 transfer of these allocations from one water account to another. 
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